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Abstract
This research is devoted to study equilibrium strategies in a game
theoretical framework for the mean-variance problem. The thesis ex-
plores the investment behaviour and interlinks between different types
of equilibrium strategies.
In order to find the open-loop strategy in discrete time, we incorpo-
rate the idea based on Hu et al. (2012) and the concept of open-loop
strategies in engineering study. In engineering study, there are two
types of strategies: open-loop and closed-loop control strategies. We
find the interpretations for both strategies in a Nash equilibrium con-
text from a financial perspective. This thesis extends the literature
by providing the existence and uniqueness of the solution of open-
loop equilibrium strategy in discrete time. Our findings point to the
causes of different equilibrium strategies in the existing literature.
We show the common issue of equilibrium strategies, i.e. that the
amount of money invested in risky assets decays to 0 as time moves
away from the maturity. Furthermore, the closed-loop strategy tends
to a negative limit depending on the assets’ Sharpe ratio. We call
this phenomenon as Mean-variance puzzle. The reason is that the
variance term penalises the wealth changes quadratically as well as
the expectation only increases linearly. By drawing in the concepts
from behavioural economics, we solve this puzzle by using the present-
biased preference. The advantage of the present-biased preference
is that equilibrium investors have the flexibility to adjust their risk
attitude based on their anticipated future.
We simulate three types of control strategies existing in the literature
and compare the investment performance. Furthermore, we evaluate
the performance with respect to different rebalancing periods.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Introduction
The modern portfolio selection theory dates back to Markowitz’s Nobel prize-
winning work (Markowitz, 1952). Before the 1950s, there was little systematic
theory for the financial market. Markowitz (1952) worked in single-period mean-
variance portfolio selection problem, which became the foundation for modern
financial portfolio theory. The first pioneering contribution made by Markowitz
is to discuss the trade-off between return and risk of the portfolio, where the
risk is measured by the variance of the portfolio return. A second significant
contribution is that Markowitz’s model provides the foundation for developing
the Capital Asset Pricing Model, which is introduced by Sharpe (1964) during
the 1960s, where the Beta risk in CAPM is now used widely in all the stock
exchange-listed companies.
In the single period of Markowitz’s framework, he identifies the return with the
expectation of the portfolio and the risk with the variance of the portfolio. As
the trade-off between return and risk, the problem focuses on how to minimise
portfolio’s variance subject to a given level of return. Then, the strategy is said
to be optimal if the portfolio achieves minimum variance subject to a prescribed
expected level of return X. The set of all optimal pairs (E[X],Var(X)) is called
Mean-Variance frontier. Following the Markovitz’s work, Merton (1971) extends
his result to the case in the single-period when short selling is allowed.
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Ever since the appearance of the Markovitz’s framework, this subject has at-
tracted a huge amount of researches on itself. However, the investor faces several
practical difficulties in multi-period time as the tradeoff information between re-
turn and risk becomes less intuitive. The multi-period mean-variance problem
has not been further investigated until the results from the paper Li & Ng (2000).
The strategy developed by Li & Ng (2000) is referred to pre-commitment strategy
because the investor pre-commits to a strategy which is only optimal at the time
of evaluation.
However, the pre-commitment strategy has its own disadvantages. Under the
pre-commitment strategy, the investor will find a different optimal strategy if he
evaluates his plan at a different time. In other words, if the investor is keen to
follow the best strategy at all times, he has to re-evaluate his plan continuously
to ensure that he is making the best decision. In modern financial market, there
are thousands of different stocks available in the market. Furthermore, if an
investor decides to follow one strategy and wants to be satisfied at any time,
then pre-commitment strategy does not meet his requirement. Therefore, the
pre-commitment strategy can be very computationally expensive.
In game theory, the Nash equilibrium is a concept related to a non-cooperative
game among two and more players. The players in the game are assumed to
know strategies of the other players. Every player in the game makes the best
decision for himself, based on what he expects the others will do. For example,
suppose two cars are driving towards a junction from perpendicular directions.
The traffic is red for car A and green for car B. The question is whether they
want to break the law if there is no police officer. As car B knows that car A will
stop in front of traffic light, then car B will make the decision that he will drive
through this junction. If not, both cars would not move. On the other side, as
car A knows that car B will drive through the junction, then the best decision
for A is to wait before the junction. Otherwise, they will crash into each other.
Therefore, the traffic light can be regarded as a law of Nash equilibrium in that
both players are willing to follow it.
In game theory context, the time-consistent mean-variance investor is playing
the optimisation game with future-self. The investor is finding the best respond-
ing strategy based on the strategies which are expected to be chosen by his
future-selves. Strotz (1955) suggested a time-consistent strategy should take into
account investor’s own belief or insight. Such own belief coincides the idea of an-
ticipating future strategy in the game theoretic framework. Therefore, the Nash
2
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subgame equilibrium approach has been proposed by Bjork & Murgoci (2010)
and Basak & Chabakauri (2010) in order to obtain a time-consistent strategy.
Suppose the equilibrium investor at time t is looking for the best strategy
sequence (ut, ut+1, . . . , uT−1). He has to pre-determine his future strategies
(ut+1, . . . , uT−1). However, the key difference between the open-loop and closed-
loop equilibrium strategies is: the open-loop investors consider their future strate-
gies at time (ut+1, . . . , uT−1) as a fix strategy (i.e. a fixed amount of money in-
vested in the stock) whereas the open-loop investors modify the future strategies
according to the different choice of strategy ut at time t. These modified future
strategy, denote as (umt+1, . . . , u
m
T−1), are only used to evaluate the strategy ut at
time t. Once the strategy ut is chosen, then the investor combine ut with the
pre-determined future strategies (ut+1, . . . , uT−1) to give a closed-loop equilib-
rium strategy. Therefore, the open-loop equilibrium investor can be viewed as
a fixed recipe investor whereas the closed-loop equilibrium investor is a flexible
recipe investor.
Stochastic control is a sub-field of control theory, which plays an important role in
economic problems. Stochastic control was developed in the late 1950s and the
early 1960s. During that period, stochastic control problems were formulated
to solve engineering problems, typically, which involve a dynamical system in
the presence of randomness. For instance, the dynamics of the system can be
described as a stochastic differential equation and the randomness described as
Brownian motion. The engineers can control the direction of dynamics and the
size of the randomness in the system. In addition, the performance of control
system is assessed by a function of future value of a stochastic process. Therefore,
the stochastic control problem is to find a control law which optimises the random
quantity (see Fleming & Rishel (2012)).
In engineering study, a manager can adjust different elements which are connected
to the system to produce the desired output. This system is referred to control
system. The control systems are classified as open loop or closed loop. The
closed loop system is also known as feedback control system. A system is called
an open loop control system if the control action is independent of the output of
the system. Alternatively, if a system is called closed loop system if a manager
determines the input of system based on the responses (or output) generating
from the previous input quantity.
In both one period and multi-period models, the strategy is said to be optimal if
this strategy gives the highest rewards at the end. The main approach in solving
3
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such optimisation problems is to derive a set of necessary conditions that must
be satisfied by any optimal control. Suppose that the investor needs to maximise
his objectives, if the investor decides to deviate from the optimal strategy by
a quantity ε, then the functional rewards will be worse off than if he had not
changed. The deviation quantity ε is called perturbation. In the classical calculus
of variations, the optimisation problem can be solved by considering the first-
order condition with respect to this perturbation. However, in the equilibrium
context, the investor is not only to find a strategy that maximises the rewards,
but also he has to be satisfied with this strategy at any time.
This thesis has three purposes: firstly, to get insights for the equilibrium control
strategies by looking at discrete time problems in detail. In order to show opti-
mality in the equilibrium setting, we need to use a perturbation and investigate
the effect of different types of perturbations to equilibrium strategies. Generally
speaking, if we obtain the equilibrium strategies that turn out to be different, we
can confirm the fact that the perturbation plays an important role of determining
the equilibrium strategy. Later, we extend our study into continuous setting by
looking at a random perturbation process. Secondly, this thesis aims to look at
how open-loop strategy compares to the closed-loop strategy and also the pre-
commitment strategy. Following the result from previous motivation, we can find
a family of different equilibrium controls by setting the perturbation differently.
In practice, it is important to see if there exists any equilibrium control that
will out-perform the rest. Third, this thesis examines whether equilibrium strat-
egy can be a better solution than the pre-commitment as the pre-commitment
strategy is widely used in financial investment.
1.2 Research questions
Research question 1
Providing the open-loop equilibrium strategy in continuous time setting, this
study explores a discrete version of open-loop equilibrium, and obtain the nec-
essary and sufficient condition for discrete open-loop strategies in the form of a
uniqueness and existence theorem.
Research question 2
By using a similar construction technique for the closed-loop equilibrium strate-
gies, this study examines the consistency of closed-loop equilibrium with the defi-
4
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nition introduced by Bjork & Murgoci (2010). This is to understand and provide
an interpretation of equilibrium strategies and different types of perturbations
from a financial prospective.
Research question 3
The simulated equilibrium strategies in the existing literature show a down-trend
in the investment proportion as time moves away from the maturity. Do equi-
librium strategies converge to any limit as time moves backwards? The decay in
equilibrium strategies makes no practical sense for the independent and identical
investment environment. Therefore, is it possible to solve this issue?
Research question 4
Compared to pre-commitment strategies, we would like to find whether the out-
comes of equilibrium strategies for the long-term investments have been improved
or not. The comparison will be tested on the basis of the situation whether the
re-evaluation is allowed. Furthermore, we would like to implement the approach
developed from Research question 3 and assess the improvement of the invest-
ment performance.
1.3 Overview of the thesis
This thesis is organised as follows: In Chapter 2, we review the previous work
for multi-period mean-variance problem which covers the pre-commitment strat-
egy by Li & Ng (2000), open-loop equilibrium strategy by Hu et al. (2012) and
closed-loop equilibrium strategy by Bjork & Murgoci (2010). Chapter 3 describes
our approach to construct open-loop equilibrium strategies in discrete time. We
derive a uniqueness and existence of open-loop strategy. Finally we present an
example to show the discrete open-loop equilibrium strategies converge to the
continuous strategies. Chapter 4 applies same technique used in Chapter 3 to
derive the closed-loop in discrete time. Further, we show the closed-loop equilib-
rium strategies decay to a negative limit as time goes to infinity. In, Chapter 5,
we relax the assumption on the type of perturbation for open-loop equilibrium
strategy in continuous time. Chapter 6.2 addresses the issue of decays in equi-
librium strategy and uses the present-biased concept from economics to fix the
issue. Chapter 7 uses numerical tools to assess the performance of different types
of equilibrium strategies. In Chapter 8, we provide a summary of our approach
5
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on studying the equilibrium strategies and give a financial interpretation of the
rationale of the equilibrium investors.
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Chapter 2
Literature review
2.1 Mean-varaince analysis in single period
time setting
The central issue in the mean-variance formulation is the optimisation of
quadratic criteria. In the literature, there are various formulations of mean-
variance problem. The classical mean-variance portfolio selection problem is
formulated as:
min
u
Var(XuT ) (P1)
s.t. E(XuT ) = c, (∗)∑
i
ui = 1. (?)
where u ∈ Rn denotes the proportion of investment allocated in ith asset and X
denotes the investor’s wealth level. Since different assets yield different returns
at terminal time, the increment of investor’s wealth depends on the way of allo-
cating u for each assets. It can be noticed that we use the original formulation in
Markowitz (1952) instead of maximising the expected return subject to the risk.
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In this formulation, the investor splits the objective (minimise the portfolio vari-
ance) and reward condition (∗). The Lagrangian of such optimisation problem
is
L(u, c, λ1, ρ1) = Var(X
u
T )− λ1(E[XuT ]− c)− ρ1(
∑
i
ui − 1).
We refer to the optimal multipliers λ1 and ρ1 as reward multiplier and budget
multipler, respectively. From the Lagrangian, the first-order necessary condi-
tion yields the optimal triple of (u∗, λ∗, ρ∗) subject to a desired level c. On the
other hand, the mean-variance problem can also be read as a concave quadratic
optimisation problem, which can be formulated as:
max λ2E[X
u
T ]−
1
2
Var(XuT ) (P2)
s.t.
∑
i
ui = 1,
for some constant λ2. The classic formulation is equivalent to the quadratic op-
timisation problem if and only if the chosen constant λ2 is equal to the optimal
reward multiplier λ1. The Markowitz framework provides an important theoret-
ical justification of the parameters λ1 and λ2. Markowitz (1968) describes this
parameter as risk aversion which represents the rational behaviour or investor’s
preference under uncertainty. Several measures of risk aversion parameters have
been justified and explored by Mossin (1968); Rubinstein (1973); Tobin (1958)
for the relation between the utility functions and the corresponding risk attitude.
It is generally assumed that the risk aversion parameter is a constant. However,
Arrow (1971) argues the constant risk aversion leads the invariance of demand
for risky assets as the present wealth changes (i.e. the strategy does not depend
on wealth level). Arrow (1971) believes that the risk aversion should decrease as
the present wealth increases. This idea will be discussed later in the equilibrium
approach.
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2.2 Mean-variance analysis in multi-period
time setting
Following the formulation from (P2), the extension of objective functional J in
the multi-period framework becomes
J(t, xt;u) = Et,x[X
u
T ]− γVart,x(XuT ),
where we assume the investor is sitting at time t with wealth level x and λ is
postive constant that penalises the risk. The conditional expectation and variance
are defined by E[XuT |Xt = x] and Var(XuT |Xt = x), respectively. The main issue
in such framework is that the Bellman’s principle does not hold and dynamic
programming cannot be applied. When the objective functional is linear in terms
of conditional expectation, the Markov property can be used to decomposit the
original problem into several sub-problems with respect to different time points.
Thus, the investor can first optimise the sub-problems and then solve the original
problem based on the previously computed solution. The obtained sequential
control strategies will form an optimal control law for the optimisation problem.
However, due to the term
(
E[X]
)2
arising from variance term, there is no global
optimal strategy in multi-period that optimises the functional at every point in
time.
There are three types of time-inconsistent problem in the literature. First, the
mean-variance optimisation problem is time-inconsistent. We recall the variance
formula:
Var(x) = E[X2]− E2[X].
We have the term E2[X], which is not an expected value of a non-linear function
of wealth, but instead a non-linear function of expected wealth. Second, the
objective functional depends on the the wealth of evaluation point. For example,
the endogenous utility function has the following form
Et,x
[
ln(XuT − x+ c)
]
, c > 0.
The different evaluation time leads to different wealth level x. Since utility func-
tion changes, the resulting strategy u will not necessarily be the same. The final
9
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time-inconsistent situation is when the utility function depends on the evaluation
time. For example,
Et,x
[ ∫ t
t
ρ(s− t)f(Xs)ds
]
.
Thus, if the optimality of obtained strategy depends on the time of the evaluat-
ing the problem, then such problem is called time inconsistent problem. Previous
research suggests there are three different methods dealing with the time incon-
sistent problem.
2.2.1 Pre-commitment strategy
The first type of the strategy is called pre-commitment which is developed by
Li & Ng (2000). The investor fixes an initial point and tries to find the con-
trol strategy which optimises the objective with respect to this fixed time point.
Li & Ng (2000)’s work is a breakthrough as it is the first paper that provides
the analytical result in multi-period discrete time setting. They use the em-
bedding technique to embed the problem (P2) into an auxiliary problem, which
is time-consistent, and obtain the optimal strategies for the auxiliary problem.
Furthermore, they show the solution set for the original problem is a subset of
the solution for auxiliary problem, and provide a necessary condition for the so-
lution of auxiliary problem attaining the optimum. Based on Li & Ng (2000)’s
study, Zhou & Li (2000) introduce the continuous stochastic linear-quadratic
framework which is a generalisation of the mean-variance problem. The authors
combine the portfolio selection problem and stochastic control theory to expand
this topic into a more complicated situation. For example, random parameters
(Lim & Zhou, 2002), regime switching market (Zhou & Yin, 2003), incomplete
market (Lim, 2004), short-selling prohibition (Li et al., 2002), and Skorokhod
embedding problem (Ankirchner et al., 2015). Besides the embedding technique
developed by Li & Ng (2000), there is an alternative approach called martingale
approach. This approach can be divided into two sub-problems. Firstly, the
investor tries to find the targeting terminal wealth level which optimises the ob-
jective function. Secondly, the investor searches for a strategy which replicates
this terminal threshold. Pliska (1982) first applies martingale approach to solve
stochastic control problem. Afterwards, according to Li & Ng (2000)’s work, Bi-
elecki et al. (2005) use martingale approach to solve the mean-variance problem
with the short-selling constraint. Compared with the embedding approach, mar-
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tingale approach appears to be more straightforward to solve the problem with
constraints.
2.2.2 Equilibrium strategy
The second type of the strategy is called equilibrium strategy, which is first in-
troduced by Basak & Chabakauri (2010). Basak & Chabakauri (2010) study
the time consistent strategy by following the suggestion from Strotz (1955):
an investor chooses “the best plan among those that he will actually follow.”
Therefore, Basak & Chabakauri (2010) investigate local behaviour of the mean-
variance strategy. The total law of the variance enables them to derive recursive
Hamiltonian-Jacob-Bellman equation to characterise the strategy. The main ob-
servation in their study is that they characterise a relationship between the HJB
equation and the expected total gains or losses from the stock investment. This
observation allows them to obtain the optimal time consistent strategy in two
parts: myopic and intertemporal investment terms. The myopic term is in the
form of discounted optimal mean-variance strategy for single period model. The
intertemporal investment term is expressed by the sensitivity of the expected to-
tal gains or losses from the stock investment with respect to the stock price and
wealth, respectively. Basak & Chabakauri (2010) examine this sensitivity of an-
ticipated gain under the risk-neutral measures and provide a characterisation of
this intertemporal investment demand under the risk-neutral measures. Basak &
Chabakauri (2010) provide the insights and benefits to the mean-variance time-
consistent strategy. One disadvantage could be the optimality of time-consistent
strategy is not defined mathematically throughout their work.
Bjork & Murgoci (2010) are the first to formulate the time consistent strategy
in game theoretic manner. It is motivated by game theory. In discrete time, the
investor at different times can be viewed as different players. Given the initial
value (t, x), the player t plays a non-cooperative game with the player t+1, ..., T .
The reward to player t is given by the performance functional, and this reward
only depends on the action chosen by himself and the actions chosen by players
t+ 1, ..., T . The player t will make the decision based on the strategies chosen by
the players t+ 1, ..., T .
In view of financial perspective, the objective functional changes at different time
t which can be understood as different investment preference, the problem can be
viewed as a game between the investor and his future self. Due to the fact that
11
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the objective rewards for the investor depend on the future strategies of his incar-
nations, every incarnation of the investor will determine the best strategy for his
own objective given his best conjecture about the others. This concept coincides
with the idea that “choose the best plan among those that he will actually follow
(Strotz, 1955).” In discrete time, the results in forming a time-consistent pol-
icy by backward recursion from the terminal. For example, the non-exponential
discounting problem (Ekeland & Lazrak, 2006) and the mean-variance problem
(Bjo¨rk et al., 2014). Wang & Forsyth (2011) study the numerical method to
obtain the equilibrium strategy. The time-consistent policy in continuous formu-
lation can be approached via two different directions: discrete time approximation
and continuous time formulation. In continuous formulation, Bjork & Murgoci
(2010) give a mathematical definition of equilibrium strategy. The Markovian
structure enables the authors to analyse the local behaviour of a general class
of time-inconsistent functionals and derive a local strategy. The local optimal-
ity yields a system of partial differential equations (PDE), which is referred to
extended Hamilton Jacobi Bellman (HJB) system. They prove a verification the-
orem for the extended HJB system to ensure that the solutions satisfying the
extended HJB are the desired value function. On the other hand, Czichowsky
(2013) studies the same problem by focusing on the mean-variance functional
via discrete approximation. He proves that the discrete time formulation solu-
tion converges to the continuous case. Bjo¨rk et al. (2017) attempt to understand
the convergence theory for the general time-inconsistent problem. Yong (2012)
studies the existence and the convergence of equilibrium discrete formulation so-
lutions for hyperbolic discounting problems. Unfortunately, to the best of our
knowledge, the existence and uniqueness of the solutions for the extended HJB
system of general functional is still an open question.
Within previous research, by applying this approach to mean-variance framework
with constant risk aversion, the obtained equilibrium control does not depend on
the wealth state. This phenomenon agrees with the result from single-period
model by Arrow (1971) where the constant risk aversion leads to the invariance
of demand for risky assets as present wealth changes. However, in practice, the
investor might change his risk attitude if any circumstances change. e.g. wealth
level, investment environment or the time remaining to retire. Henderson &
Hobson (2013) point out that the risk aversion can also depend on the timing.
Having realised this, Bjo¨rk et al. (2014) suggest a state-dependent risk aversion
parameter for mean-variance problem and focus the risk aversion parameter λ
in the form of c
xt
for a positive constant c and wealth level xt. This is because,
as Arrow (1971) pointed out, risk aversion decreases as present wealth increases.
12
2.2 Mean-variance analysis in multi-period time setting
Bjo¨rk et al. (2014) derive extended HJB system for a general state-dependent risk
aversion. Having focused on risk aversion in the form of c
xt
, they deduce further
that the equilibrium control can be written in the feedback form and linear in
term of wealth state (e.g. u(t, x) = a(t)x). They provide a sufficient condition
(an integral equation) that a(t) must satisfy and prove the uniqueness of the
solution for the integral equation. They propose a numerical scheme to compute
the time-coefficient a(t) from the integral equation and show the convergence
theory for such scheme. As an extension of the model, Bensoussan et al. (2014)
explore the same problem with no short-selling. Besides the state-dependent risk
aversion, another way to have a wealth dependent equilibrium strategy is when
there are only risky assets available in the market, which is studied by Lam et al.
(2016). The reason to consider the risky asset only is due to the stochastic nature
of real interest rates and the inflation risk. A risk-free asset hardly exists in a
long investment horizon. Aside from portfolio selection problem, there are several
applications of equilibrium approach developed in Bjork & Murgoci (2010). For
example, a number of research (Li et al., 2012; Zeng & Li, 2011; Zeng et al., 2013)
has studied the reinsurance problem for mean-variance objective reinsurer. Yao
et al. (2013) and Wei et al. (2013) look at asset–liability management problem
with endogenous liabilities and regime switching, respectively.
Hu et al. (2012) design the game theoretic formulation to the general dynamic
setting. Due to the nature of general dynamic system, the impact of deviating
from a strategy at a specific time cannot be fully characterised until all the infor-
mation is observed. Hu et al. (2012) use a random variable as the perturbation to
the wealth process. They study the differences between perturbed functional and
unperturbed functional. They later introduce two families of backward stochastic
differential equations (BSDEs), which characterises this difference between the
functionals. This characterisation allows them to deduce a necessary condition
for the equilibrium strategy for general dynamic. However, regarding the mean-
variance problem with the same set-up, the equilibrium strategy developed in
Hu et al. (2012) is not the same as the closed-loop equilibrium strategy in Bjork
& Murgoci (2010). Due to the feature of general dynamic system, the strategy
in Hu et al. (2012) is referred to an open-loop equilibrium strategy. Hu et al.
(2015) take a step further and investigate connections between a family of BSDEs
and the equilibrium condition. They reduce the family of BSDEs into a single
BSDE, which enables them to have a deeper understanding of a specific structure
of the necessary condition. They obtain a sufficient condition and provide the
uniqueness of open-loop equilibrium strategy for linear-quadratic problem. Alia
13
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et al. (2016) attempt to solve the reinsurance problem by using the open-loop
equilibrium approach.
2.2.3 Dynamic optimal strategy
Another approach to solve the time-inconsistent issue is called dynamic opti-
mal strategy, which is first introduced in Pedersen & Peskir (2017). Pedersen &
Peskir (2017) point out a key drawback of pre-commitment strategy that it uses
the initial points (t, xt) to determine all future optimal strategy us for all s > t.
However, at least in Markovian framework, the investor should forget the past in-
formation and rely on the most updated information to evaluate the strategy. The
notion of dynamic optimality yields a strategy in a time-consistent manner that
it optimises the objective at each new point in time and wealth state. Intuitively,
dynamic optimality requires the investor to solve infinitely many optimal control
problems based on the different initial time points and wealth levels. In the game
theoretic point of view, the dynamic optimality considers incarnations of the in-
vestors achieving their own objective rewards in an aggressive way. Pedersen &
Peskir (2017) derive a closed-form solution for dynamic optimal strategy. The dy-
namic optimal strategy shares a lot of similarities with pre-commitment strategy.
In particular, they both achieve the same expected terminal wealth or termi-
nal value function. However, at the initial point, the value function of dynamic
optimal strategy strictly dominates the value function of pre-commitment strat-
egy. Vigna (2016) further investigates the difference in value function between
dynamic optimal and pre-commitment strategy and shows that this difference
is decreasing through time until it vanishes at the terminal. Vigna (2016) also
studies the value functions between pre-commitment and equilibrium strategy
and shows the value function of pre-commitment out-performs the equilibrium
value function until terminal time. Pedersen & Peskir (2017) study a constrained
case where the dynamic wealth is bounded from above. The authors identify
the behaviour that the dynamic optimal wealth process remains below the upper
bound until it hits the target at terminal. Pedersen & Peskir (2015) explore a
case when the dynamic wealth is constrained from above and below. Pedersen &
Peskir (2015) show that the terminal wealth under the dynamic optimal strategy
can only take two values from the upper and lower bounds.
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Although the above literature review on the time consistent approach for the
mean-variance portfolio selection problem has broadened us with the understand-
ing on the rationale of time-consistent problem, in particular, the equilibrium
approach. However, this method has some limitations.
First of all, in the classic control theory with Markovian system, the open-loop
strategy and the closed-loop strategy are identical. However, the current results
lead the equilibrium investor into two different directions: open-loop equilibrium
(Hu et al. (2012)) and closed-loop equilibrium (Bjork & Murgoci (2014)) with
completely different trading strategies. The majority of previously paper focus
on the application of a particular type of equilibrium including Liang & Song
(2015), Zeng & Li (2011) and Alia et al. (2016), but they do not consider the
differences between the two approaches. Vigna (2016) compares the value func-
tion between pre-commitment, closed-loop and dynamic optimal strategies. A
number of paper use the closed-loop equilibrium to define the notion of equilib-
rium strategy. Hence, their analysis and numeric results may underestimate the
performance of the equilibrium strategy. Basak & Chabakauri (2010) provide
insights of the rationale of a closed-loop investor and the structure of a closed-
loop equilibrium strategy. However, little research has investigated the open-loop
strategy in discrete formulation. To complete the study about open-loop strategy
and understand the rationale of open-loop investor, I will focus on the open-loop
equilibrium in the discrete time formulation. Studying the discrete formulation
allows us to investigate the structure of open-loop equilibrium strategy. By doing
so, the effect of dynamic wealth can be identified and the differences between the
rationale of the equilibrium can be studied.
Secondly, the existing results about equilibrium approach indicate that the pro-
portion of wealth invested in stocks decreases as the investor moves away from
maturity. The explanation of this phenomenon is complex. Considering the pre-
commitment, the martingale approach prescribes an optimal terminal wealth and
the investor increases the risky asset investment towards the end of the invest-
ment period in order to reach the benchmark. In mean-variance framework, the
risk is measured by the variance which is a quadratic function of the wealth dy-
namic while the return is measured by the expectation which is a linear function
of the wealth dynamic. This is consistent with the equilibrium approach. The
variance term is not a coherent risk measure (Artzner et al., 1999) in which the
risk/cost arising from each time period is not additive. Therefore, the starting
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control strategy has more impact on the volatility of the wealth dynamic than the
future strategies. Similarly, the equilibrium strategy prescribes the small stock
investment when the investor is far away from the maturity as well as large stock
investment when the investor is near the maturity. This finding is also supported
by Aivaliotis & Palczewski (2014). They study the mean-variance objective func-
tional depending on the whole trajectory of the control process instead of terminal
wealth. However, when the investment period is sufficiently long, compared to
the pre-commitment strategy, the equilibrium strategy behaves differently at the
starting point. To our best knowledge, little study has looked at the behaviour
of trajectory of the equilibrium strategy.
Finally, Markowitz (1968) discusses the advantages and limitations of using vari-
ance as the risk measure. The main issue is that the variance penalises the wealth
process for being too high as well as being too low. This limits the investment
strategy to seek for a situation that is profitable. These considerations drive
the research into asymmetric risk measures involving lower partial moments and
semi-variance. Research in this area includes Markowitz et al. (1993), Bawa &
Lindenberg (1977), Harlow & Rao (1989), Rockafellar & Uryasev (2000), and
Krokhmal et al. (2002). More recently the idea of cash withdrawal technique
was introduced and further developed by Cui et al. (2012). Cui et al. (2012)
study the situation where investor decides to withdraw the cash dynamically to
avoid the wealth level to be too high. The cash withdrawal strategy achieves
the same efficient mean-variance pair of the terminal wealth as well as offers free
cash flow by the withdrawal. In the context of equilibrium approach in the multi-
period framework, the portfolio optimisation problem using semi-variance has not
received much attention. Rudloff et al. (2014) consider the time-consistent strat-
egy for mean-cvar problem based on nested objective functional. However, in
my thesis, I will concentrate on the empirical study of the equilibrium approach
to evaluate the performance. The reason is that, when the notion of optimality
changes to equilibrium, it is less intuitive to determine the real objective for the
equilibrium investor. It is no longer to optimise the mean-variance objective at
every point in time. Instead, the investor plays a game with the future incarna-
tions of himself. Therefore, comparing the equilibrium value function with the
rest becomes less effective.
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Chapter 3
Open-loop equilibrium strategy
in discrete time
3.1 Introduction
Hu et al. (2012) first study the equilibrium strategy for linear-quadratic opti-
mization problem, which is an extended study for the previous paper by Zhou
& Li (2000). The equilibrium control problem in continuous time framework
has been developed by using the spike variation in which the investor deviates
the strategy in a short time horizon and study the infinitesimal of the objective
functions. This chapter aims to use a similar approach to study the equilibrium
strategy in discrete time setting. In Hu et al. (2012), the authors define the
perturbation as a random variable in continuous time. As described earlier, the
two different perturbations used in the existing research lead to different strate-
gies. However, compare to the continuous case, it is more straightforward to
investigate the rationale of the equilibrium strategy in discrete time. Therefore,
this chapter presents the perturbed method in discrete time for obtaining the
open-loop equilibrium strategy.
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3.2 Overview of the model and the equilibrium
condition
We consider a discrete time, finite horizon, (t ∈ T := {0, 1, . . . , T}) a general
market with (n + 1) available assets: a risk-free bond S0t with its deterministic
growth factor rt at time t and n risky stock assets with prices St = [S
1
t , . . . , S
n
t ]
T
with its random return factor bit :=
Sit
Sit−1
at time t for i = 1, . . . , n, where (·)T
denotes a transformed vector. It is assumed that the first and second moment of
bt are known and the Cov(bt) is strictly positive definite. The information set
at time t is given by
Ft = σ(S0,S1, . . . ,St).
A self-financing investor joins the market at any time t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T−1} with the
wealth Xt. Therefore, his entire investment strategy is described by a sequence
of Rn-valued random variables u¯t := (ut, . . . ,uT−1), where us = [u1s, . . . , uns ]T
and uis is the amount of wealth invested in the i
th risky asset in period s. Let A
denotes the admissible set and a strategy is said to be admissible us ∈ A if us
is Fs-measurable and bs+1us is square integrable for all s. Since the amount of
money invested in the risk-free asset at time t is X u¯t −
∑n
i=1 u
i
t, the dynamics of
investor’s wealth follow
X u¯t+1 =
n∑
i=1
uit
Sit
Sit+1 + (X
u¯
t −
n∑
i=1
uit) e
r0t = AtX
u¯
t + B
T
t+1ut, (3.1)
where At = e
r0t and Bt+1 := [B
1
t+1, B
2
t+1, . . . , B
n
t+1]
T = [(b1t+1 − er0t ), (b2t+1 −
er
0
t ), . . . , (bnt+1 − er0t )]T . When it is clear from the context, we will drop u¯ from
X u¯t .
Suppose the investor entering the market at time t with the wealth Xt ∈ L2(Ft)
would like to maximize the following mean-variance objective functional over
admissible investment strategies:
ess sup
u¯∈A
{
XtEt[X
u¯
T ]−
γ
2
Vart[X
u¯
T ]
}
, (3.2)
where γ > 0 will be called the investor’s risk aversion, andEt[·] and Vart(·) denote
E[·|Ft] and Var(·|Ft), respectively. Notice that under the assumption that Xt > 0
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a.s., this problem is equivalent to the classical Markowitz mean-variance criterion
for the return of the portfolio over [t, T ]
ess sup
u¯
{
Et[X
u¯
T /Xt]−
γ
2
Vart[X
u¯
T /Xt]
}
.
Criterion (3.2) can also be interpreted, c.f. Bjo¨rk et al. (2014), as imposing
a state-dependent risk aversion γ
2Xt
whereby the investor with a higher wealth
would be more risk-seeking than the investor with a lower wealth.
For an admissible strategy u¯t and an initial wealth Xt ∈ L2(Ft) at time t, denote
J(t,Xt; u¯t) = XtEt[X
u¯
T ]−
γ
2
Vart[X
u¯
T ].
3.3 Open-loop strategy for mean-variance prob-
lem
Definition 3.3.1. An admissible strategy u¯∗0 ≡ (u∗0,u∗1, . . . ,u∗T−1) is an open-
loop equilibrium control if for any t and any bounded Rn-valued Ft-measurable
random variable ε
J(t,X u¯
∗,ε
t ; u¯
∗,ε
t )− J(t,X u¯
∗
t ; u¯
∗
t ) ≤ 0, a.s.,
where u¯∗t = (u
∗
t ,u
∗
t+1, . . . ,u
∗
T−1), and u¯
∗,ε
t = (u
∗
t + ε,u
∗
t+1, . . . ,u
∗
T−1).
The idea of the equilibrium concept is that, when the investor decides to change
the investment at any single point t = 0, . . . , T−1, the rewards for investor would
be worse than if he had not changed the strategy.
Dynamics (3.1) allow for explicit expression for the terminal wealth. Given Xt ∈
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L2(Ft) at time t and an admissible control u¯t we have
X u¯T = AT−1X
u¯
T−1 + B
T
TuT−1
= AT−1
(
AT−2X u¯T−2 + B
T
T−1uT−2
)
+ BTTuT−1
=
( T−1∏
i=T−2
Ai
)
X u¯T−2 + AT−1B
T
T−1uT−2 + B
T
TuT−1
Define DT = 1 and Dt =
∏T−1
i=t Ai, then
X u¯T = DT−2X
u¯
T−2 +DT−1B
T
T−1uT−2 +DTB
T
TuT−1
Repeating the above procedure until time t, we obtain
X u¯T = DtXt +
T−1∑
s=t
Ds+1B
T
s+1us (3.3)
For a perturbed control u¯εt , as constructed in Definition 3.3.1, the terminal wealth
equals
X u¯
ε
T = DtX
u¯
t +
T−1∑
s=t+1
Ds+1B
T
s+1us +Dt+1B
T
t+1(ut + ε)
= DtX
u¯
t +
T−1∑
s=t
Ds+1B
T
s+1us +Dt+1B
T
t+1ε
= X u¯T +Dt+1B
T
t+1ε (3.4)
The expression (3.4) shows that, the perturbed wealth process is differed from the
original process by a term Dt+1B
T
t+1ε. The extra term can be view as following:
investing ε amount of money into the stock market at time t. After one-period
time, the amount becomes BTt+1ε. The investor then withdraws it from the stock
market and invests it into the risk-free bond until terminal time.
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Define V u¯T = 0 and
V u¯t =
T−1∑
s=t
Ds+1B
T
s+1us, t = 0, . . . , T − 1, (3.5)
and introduce the notation that will be used to characterise equilibrium strategy:
Σt = Covt[Bt+1], µt = Et[Bt+1], β
u¯
t = Covt[Bt+1,Et+1 V
u¯
t+1].
Formulae (3.3)-(3.4) play an important role in deriving open-loop equilibrium
controls. In the following theorem, we prove the uniqueness of open-loop equi-
librium strategy for a general wealth process (3.1). As a by-product, we obtain
a recursive formula for backward computation of a candidate strategy. If this
strategy satisfies the required integrability conditions, i.e., Bt+1ut ∈ L2(Ft) for
all t then it is an open-loop equilibrium control. Otherwise, there is no admissible
equilibrium strategy.
Theorem 3.3.2. A open-loop equilibrium control u¯∗t satisfies
u∗t =
1
γDt+1
Σ−1t
(
X u¯
∗
t µt − γβu¯
∗
t
)
. (3.6)
Proof. Fix an admissible control strategy u¯ and assume perturbed version of this
admissible strategy u¯ε with a deterministic perturbation ε ∈ Rn applied at time
t. Later, we can relax the condition for the perturbation ε. Recalling expressions
(3.3)-(3.4), we notice that
Et[X
u¯ε
T ] = Et[X
u¯
T ] +Dt+1µ
T
t ε.
Recall the law of total variance,
Var(Y ) = E[Var(Y |X)] + Var(E[Y |X]),
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we obtain
Vart[X
u¯ε
T ] = Et
[
Vart+1[X
u¯,ε
T ]
]
+ Vart
[
Et+1[X
u¯,ε
T ]
]
= Et
[
Vart+1[Vt+1]
]
+ Vart
[
DtXt +Dt+1B
T
t+1(ut + ε) +Et+1[Vt+1]
]
= Et
[
Vart+1[Vt+1]
]
+ Vart
[
Et+1[Vt+1]
]
+D2t+1(ut + ε)
TΣt(ut + ε)
+ 2Dt+1β
T
t (ut + ε)
= Vart[Vt+1] +D
2
t+1(ut + ε)
TΣt(ut + ε) + 2Dt+1β
T
t (ut + ε),
where in β and Vt we skipped the superscript u¯. Therefore,
J(t,X u¯t ; u¯
ε
t)− J(t,X u¯t ; u¯t)
= X u¯t Dt+1µ
T
t ε−
γ
2
(
D2t+1(ut + ε)
TΣt(ut + ε) + 2Dt+1β
T
t (ut + ε)
−D2t+1uTt Σtut − 2Dt+1βTt ut
)
= X u¯t Dt+1µ
T
t ε− γD2t+1uTt Σε−
γ
2
D2t+1ε
TΣtε− γDt+1βTt ε. (3.7)
For u¯ to be an open equilibrium strategy, the above expression has to be a.s.
non-positive for any ε, in particular, for deterministic ε. As Σt is strictly positive
definite, the equation (3.7) is a strictly concave function in ε. The condition
of non-positivity is satisfied if and only if the maximum is at ε = 0. Due to
concavity, the first order condition is necessary and sufficient. The derivative
with respect to ε reads
X u¯t µt − γDt+1Σtut − γDt+1Σtε− γβt.
The first order condition at ε = 0 takes the form:
X u¯t µt − γDt+1Σtut − γβt = 0.
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Therefore, ut has to satisfy
ut =
1
γDt+1
Σ−1t
(
X u¯t µt − γβt
)
. (3.8)
For the sufficient condition, inserting the above expression (3.8) into (3.7) gives
J(t,X u¯t ; u¯
ε
t)− J(t,X u¯t ; u¯t) = −
γ
2
D2t+1ε
TΣtε,
which is non-positive for all ε. Now, we relax ε to be a bounded Ft-measurable
random variable. Due to positive definiteness of Σt, the above expression is non-
positive for all ε.
Condition (3.6) provides a recipe for constructing an open-loop equilibrium. At
T − 1, VT = 0, so βT = 0 and uT−1 is uniquely determined by the conditional
moments of BT given FT−1. Moving to T −2, the random variable VT−1 is known
and therefore βT−1 can be computed, provided that the covariance is well-defined
(it will be discussed later on). Equation (3.6) gives a unique characterisation of
uT−2, and we continue down to u0.
The above procedure depends on the ability to compute the covariance βt. If
at each step, we could obtain an admissible strategy (i.e. bs+1us is square in-
tegrable for all s ) and Vt =
∑T−1
s=t Ds+1B
T
s+1us is square-integrable. Therefore,
the covariance βt is well-defined. The control strategy exists if and only if, in
each step of the above procedure, the calculated risky asset position ut ∈ A,
i.e. BTt+1ut ∈ L2(Ft+1). It is not clear that the condition (3.6) yields a unique
construction control sequence as the random variable Vt does depend on all the
control us for s ≤ t. We summarise these findings below.
Theorem 3.3.3. Define Kt by the following:
Kt =E
−1
t+1
( 1
γDt+1
Σ−1t µt −
1
Dt+1
Σ−1t AtCovt
(
Bt+1,Et+1[Mt+1]
))
,
where
Et+1 = I +
1
Dt+1
Σ−1t Covt
(
Bt+1,Et+1[Mt+1]B
T
t+1
)
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and Mt+1 is constructed by induction:
Mt+1 :=
[ T−1∑
s=t+2
Ds+1B
T
s+1Ks
( s−1∏
n=t+1
(An + B
T
n+1Kn)
)
+Dt+2B
T
t+2Kt+1
]
and MT = 0. If the above inverse of the matrix Et+1 is well-defined for all t, the
control
u∗t = KtX
∗
t ,
where X∗t =
∏t−1
i=0
(
Ai + B
T
i+1Ki
)
X0, is the unique open-loop equilibrium control.
Proof. The theorem 3.3.2 characterises a necessary and sufficient condition for
equilibrium control. It allows us to construct the control recursively. However, βt
is not necessarily unique since it depends on the control sequence {u0, . . . , uT−1}.
We need to show that, under such construction, the equilibrium control is
uniquely defined.
At time T-1, we have βT−1 = 0, so
u∗T−1 =
1
γDT
Σ−1T−1
(
X u¯
∗
T−1µT−1
)
=
( 1
γDT
Σ−1T−1µT−1
)
X u¯
∗
T−1
:= KT−1X u¯
∗
T−1,
where KT−1 is FT−1-measurable that depends only on the filtration of the stock
price σ(S0, . . . , ST−1).
Assume that u∗s = KsX
u¯∗
s for all s ≥ t + 1 and Ks depends only on the fil-
tration of the stock price σ(S0, . . . , Ss), i.e., it does not depend on any of the
control sequence {u∗0, . . . ,u∗s−1}. Therefore, we can rewrite the wealth at time
t+ 2, . . . , T − 1 in terms of the wealth at time t+ 1 in the following way:
X u¯
∗
t+2 =
(
At+1 + B
T
t+2Kt+1
)
X u¯
∗
t+1,
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X u¯
∗
t+3 =
(
At+2 + B
T
t+3Kt+2
)(
At+1 + B
T
t+2Kt+1
)
X u¯
∗
t+1.
Therefore, for any s ∈ {t+ 2, . . . , T − 1},
X u¯
∗
s =
( s−1∏
n=t+1
(An + B
T
n+1Kn
))
X u¯
∗
t+1.
Then we have
V u¯
∗
t+1 =
T−1∑
s=t+1
Ds+1B
T
s+1u
∗
s
=
T−1∑
s=t+1
Ds+1B
T
s+1KsX
u¯∗
s
=
T−1∑
s=t+2
Ds+1B
T
s+1Ks
[( s−1∏
n=t+1
(An + B
T
n+1Kn)
)
X u¯
∗
t+1
]
+Dt+2B
T
t+2Kt+1X
u¯∗
t+1
=
[ T−1∑
s=t+2
Ds+1B
T
s+1Ks
( s−1∏
n=t+1
(An + B
T
n+1Kn)
)
+Dt+2B
T
t+2Kt+1
]
·X u¯∗t+1
:= Mt+1 ·X u¯∗t+1,
where Mt+1 is a FT−1-measurable random variable which depends only on stock
price filtration σ(S0, . . . , ST−1). Therefore
βt = Covt
[
Bt+1,Et+1[V
u¯∗
t+1]
]
= Covt
[
Bt+1,Et+1[Mt+1]X
u¯∗
t+1
]
= Covt
[
Bt+1,Et+1[Mt+1](AtX
u¯∗
t + B
T
t+1u
∗
t )
]
= AtX
u¯∗
t Covt
[
Bt+1,Et+1[Mt+1]
]
+ Covt
[
Bt+1,Et+1[Mt+1]Bt+1
]
u∗t .
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Substituting βt into (3.8), we obtain
u∗t =
1
γDt+1
Σ−1t
(
X u¯
∗
t µt − γβt
)
=
1
γDt+1
Σ−1t X
u¯∗
t µt −
1
Dt+1
Σ−1t βt
=
1
γDt+1
Σ−1t X
u¯∗
t µt −
AtX
u¯∗
t
Dt+1
Σ−1t Covt
[
Bt+1,Et+1[Mt+1]
]
− 1
Dt+1
Σ−1t Covt
[
Bt+1,Et+1[Mt+1]Bt+1
]
u∗t .
Rearranging above expression, we get
(
I +
1
Dt+1
Σ−1t Covt
[
Bt+1,Et+1[Mt+1]Bt+1
])
u∗t
=
(
1
γDt+1
Σ−1t µt −
At
Dt+1
Σ−1t Covt
[
Bt+1,Et+1[Mt+1]
])
X u¯
∗
t .
Under the assumption that the matrix
(
I +
1
Dt+1
Σ−1t Covt
[
Bt+1,Et+1[Mt+1]Bt+1
])
is invertible, then we have
u∗t =
(
I +
1
Dt+1
Σ−1t Covt
[
Bt+1,Et+1[Mt+1]Bt+1
])−1( 1
γDt+1
Σ−1t µt
− At
Dt+1
Σ−1t Covt
[
Bt+1,Et+1[Mt+1]
])
X u¯
∗
t
= KtX
u¯∗
t
where Kt is Ft-measurable depends only on the stock price filtration σ(S0, . . . , St)
By induction, we can construct an unique strategy sequence u =
(u0, u1, . . . , uT−1). Since such construction agrees the form in equation (3.8),
the sufficiency is followed by Theorem 3.3.2.
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The above theorem shows that the open-loop equilibrium control is linear in
term of wealth X with a random coeffient K. For t ∈ (0, . . . , T − 1), any random
coefficient Kt is independent of choices of the strategies (u0, . . . , ut−1). Although
we construct the equilibrium strategy backward, we can compute each random
coefficient Kt for all t and the value of Kt is uniquely defined with respect to the
stock price filtration.
Corollary 3.3.4. Assume the excess return Bt is essentially bounded for all
t, i.e. there exists a constant c such that ess supω∈Ω |Bt| = c1 < ∞ for all t,
and ess supω ‖Σ−1‖u ≤ c2 < ∞. Also the matrix Et defined in theorem 3.3.3 is
invertible for all t. Then an open-loop equilibium strategy is unique. Moreover, it
is determined by a backward procedure stemming from (3.6) provided that at each
step the calculated ut satisfies that B
T
t+1ut is a square integrable random variable.
(i.e. admissible strategy)
Proof. Define the upper and lower bounds on L2 norm space as:
‖A‖u = max‖ξ‖2=1
‖Aξ‖2
‖A‖l = min‖ξ‖2=1
‖Aξ‖2
For any t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T − 1}, there exists some constants c1 and c2 such that
ess sup
ω
|Bt| = c1 <∞,
ess sup
ω
∥∥Σ−1∥∥
u
≤ c2 <∞.
Recall that u∗t = KtX
u¯∗
t where
Kt :=
(
I+
1
Dt+1
Σ−1t Covt
[
Bt+1,Et+1[Mt+1]Bt+1
])−1
(
1
γDt+1
Σ−1t µt −
At
Dt+1
Σ−1t Covt
[
Bt+1,Et+1[Mt+1]
])
.
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Then, for any t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T − 1},
E
[(
BTt+1u
∗
t
)2] ≤ c21E [(u∗t )2]
= c21E
[
KTt Kt
(
X u¯
∗
t )
2
]
.
We will prove by induction that Kt is bounded for any t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T − 1}. At
time T − 1, since βT−1 = 0, then
∥∥KTT−1KT−1∥∥u ≤ 1γ2D2T ∥∥µTT−1Σ−1T−1Σ−1T−1µT−1∥∥u
≤ 1
γ2D2T
∥∥µTT−1∥∥u ( ∥∥Σ−1T−1∥∥u )2 ‖µT−1‖u
=
c21c
2
2
γ2D2T
,
which is bounded from above. We make the following induction hypothe-
sis: if {Kt+1, . . . ,KT−1} are bounded, then Kt is bounded. Denote d =
max {‖Kt+1‖u , . . . , ‖KT−1‖u}. Since Kt is a product of two matrices, we can
prove that the operator norm is bounded for each individual matrix. Since(
I + 1
Dt+1
Σ−1t Covt
[
Bt+1,Et+1[Mt+1]Bt+1
])−1
is a n× n square-matrix, then
∥∥∥∥(I+ 1Dt+1 Σ−1t Covt[Bt+1,Et+1[Mt+1]Bt+1]
)−1∥∥∥∥
u
=
∥∥∥∥(I+ 1Dt+1 Σ−1t Covt[Bt+1,Et+1[Mt+1]Bt+1]
)∥∥∥∥−1
l
Since the matrix
(
I + 1
Dt+1
Σ−1t Covt
[
Bt+1,Et+1[Mt+1]Bt+1
])
is an n × n real
symmetric matrix. Therefore, the matrix has n number of non-zero eigenval-
ues {λ1, . . . , λn}.
Theorem. Given A ∈ Cn×n, suppose rank(A) = n. Then
min
‖x‖=1
‖Ax‖2 = σmin(A)
28
3.3 Open-loop strategy for mean-variance problem
Proof. For any ‖x‖ = 1,
‖Ax‖2 = ‖UΣV ′x‖2
= ‖ΣV ′x‖2
= ‖Σy‖2 for y = V ′x.
Then,
‖Σy‖2 =
(
Σni=1 |σiyi|2
)2 ≥ σmin
Denote λmin = min{|λ1| , . . . , |λn|}, then
∥∥∥∥(I + 1Dt+1 Σ−1t Covt[Bt+1,Et+1[Mt+1]Bt+1]
)−1∥∥∥∥
u
≤ 1
λmin
.
To prove the boundedness for
(
1
γDt+1
Σ−1t µt −
At
Dt+1
Σ−1t Covt
[
Bt+1,Et+1[Mt+1]
])
,
we will need the following estimates:
‖Mt+1‖u =
∥∥∥∥∥
T−1∑
s=t+2
Ds+1B
T
s+1Ks
( s−1∏
n=t+1
(An + B
T
n+1Kn)
)
+Dt+2B
T
t+2Kt+1
∥∥∥∥∥
u
≤
T−1∑
s=t+2
∥∥∥∥∥Ds+1BTs+1Ks(
s−1∏
n=t+1
(An + B
T
n+1Kn)
)∥∥∥∥∥
u
+
∥∥Dt+2BTt+2Kt+1∥∥u
≤
T−1∑
s=t+2
Ds+1c1d
( s−1∏
n=t+1
(An + c1d)
)
+Dt+2c1d
=: c3 <∞,
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and
∥∥Covt[Bt+1,Et+1[Mt+1]Bt+1]∥∥u
=
∥∥∥∥Et [Bt+1BTt+1Et+1[Mt+1]]−Et [Bt+1]Et [BTt+1Et+1[Mt+1]]T∥∥∥∥
u
≤
∥∥∥Et [Bt+1BTt+1Et+1[Mt+1]]∥∥∥
u
+
∥∥∥∥Et [Bt+1]Et [BTt+1Et+1[Mt+1]]T∥∥∥∥
u
≤ 2c21c3 =: c4.
Therefore,
∥∥∥∥ 1γDt+1 Σ−1t µt − AtDt+1 Σ−1t Covt
[
Bt+1,Et+1[Mt+1]
]∥∥∥∥
u
≤
∥∥∥∥ 1γDt+1 Σ−1t µt
∥∥∥∥
u
+
∥∥∥∥ AtDt+1 Σ−1t Covt
[
Bt+1,Et+1[Mt+1]
]∥∥∥∥
u
≤ 1
γDt+1
∥∥Σ−1t ∥∥u ‖µt‖u + AtDt+1 ∥∥Σ−1t ∥∥u
∥∥∥Covt[Bt+1,Et+1[Mt+1]]∥∥∥
u
≤ c1c2
γDt+1
+
Atc2c4
Dt+1
.
This yields
∥∥KTt Kt∥∥u ≤ 1λ21
( c1c2
γDt+1
+
Atc2c4
Dt+1
)2
<∞.
Hence, we have shown that Kt is bounded for any t ∈ {0, . . . , T − 1}. This
implies the control u∗t is admissible if and only if the wealth level X
u¯∗
t is square-
integrable. Since the initial wealth of investor entering the market, the starting
wealth is a constant at that point. Then, this implies the control u0 is admissible.
As a consequence, X1 is square-integrable under the admissible control u0. Follow
such procedure, at maturity time, we obtain an admissible equilibrium control
sequence {u∗0, . . . ,u∗T−1}.
Although formula (3.6) can be expressed in the feedback form, a more convenient
formulation can be obtained using a slightly different decomposition of wealth
than in the proof of Theorem 3.3.2.
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To simplify notation in the Markovian case, we writeEtsx[·] forE[·|St = s,Xt = x]
and analogously for the variance and covariance operator. When the conditioning
is on the state variables St, the state variable x is omitted in the notation, for
example, Ets[·] = E[·|St = s].
Theorem 3.3.5. In the Markovian setting (i.e. the stock price process admits
strong Markov property), an open-loop equilibrium strategy u¯∗ satisfies
u∗t = αt(St) Xt,
where
αt(s) =
(
Covts
[
ht+1(sBt+1)Bt+1, Bt+1
])−1(1
γ
Ets[Bt+1]−AtCovts
[
ht+1(sBt+1), Bt+1
])
and the function h is given by the following recursive equation:
ht(s) = Ets[ht+1(sBt+1)(At +B
T
t+1αt(s))], t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T − 1}
hT (s) = 1,
with Etsx[X
u¯∗
T ] = E[X
u¯∗
T |St = s,Xt = x] = ht(s)x.
Proof. In Markovian setting, the We will prove by backward induction that in
the Markovian setting, for each t, there are functions αt, ht : (0,∞)n → R such
that an equilibrium strategy is given by
u∗t = αt(St)Xt, (3.9)
Etsx[X
u¯∗
T ] = ht(s)x. (3.10)
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We will use the following notation:
Γˆt(s) = Covts[ht+1(sBt+1)Bt+1, Bt+1],
µˆt(s) = Ets[Bt+1],
βˆt(s) = Covts[ht+1(sBt+1), Bt+1].
Note that Γˆt is an n×n matrix while the other two objects are column n-vectors.
Assume that the conditional expectation of the terminal wealth agrees the repre-
sentation (3.10) for time t+1 (it trivially holds for T with hT (s) = 1). The proof
uses the characterisation (3.8) of an open-loop equilibrium. For that we have to
compute βt in terms of the quantities defined above. Notice that XT = DtXt+Vt,
hence Etsx[Vt] = (ht(s)−Dt)x. Therefore, βt = Covt[Et+1 Vt+1,Bt+1] has the fol-
lowing representation
βt = Covtsx
[(
ht+1(sBt+1)−Dt+1
)
(Ax+BTt+1u
∗
t ), Bt+1
]
= Γˆt(s)u
∗
t + Axβˆt(s)−Dt+1Σtu∗t .
Inserting it into (3.8) and making use of the Markovian property of the price
process gives
u∗t =
1
γDt+1
Σ−1t
(
µˆt(St)Xt − γΓˆt(St)u∗t − γAβˆt(St)Xt + γDt+1Σtu∗t
)
.
This simplifies to
0 =
1
γDt+1
Σ−1t
(
µˆt(St)Xt − γΓˆt(St)u∗t − γAβˆt(St)Xt
)
.
Due to positive-definiteness of Σt, we conclude that the expression inside of the
bracket has to be zero. Hence u∗t satisfies
u∗t = Γˆ
−1
t (St)
(1
γ
µˆt(St)− Aβˆt(St)
)
Xt.
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Therefore, u∗t can be represented as a function of s and x: u
∗
t (s, x) = αt(s)x,
where
αt(s) = Γˆ
−1
t (s)
(1
γ
µˆt(s)− Aβˆt(s)
)
which coincides with the expression in the statement of Theorem 3.3.5.
It remains to prove the recursive formula for ht(s). Substituting the open-loop
equilibrium control into the functional at time t, we obtain
Etsx[X
u¯∗
T ] = Etsx[E[X
u¯∗
T |St+1 = sBt+1, Xt+1 = Atx+BTt+1u∗t ]]
= Etsx
[
ht+1(stBt+1)(Atx+B
T
t+1u
∗
t )
]
= Etsx
[
ht+1(stBt+1)(At +B
T
t+1αt(s))x
]
= ht(s)x.
Corollary 3.3.6. Assume Bt, t ∈ {1, . . . , T}, are independent random variables
with the mean µt and the covariance matrix Σt. The unique open-loop equilibrium
strategy u¯∗ is given by
u∗t =
1
γht+1
Σ−1t µt Xt, (3.11)
where the sequence of real numbers ht, t = 1, . . . , T , satisfies
ht = ht+1At +
1
γ
µTt Σ
−1
t µt.
Proof. Under the independence assumption, the result of Corollary 3.3.6 can be
easily shown by Theorem 3.3.5. Hence, we only need to show that the equilibrium
control found by Corollary 3.3.6 is admissible, that is BTt ut ∈ L2 for any t ∈
{0, . . . T − 1}, i.e.
E
[
(BTt+1u
∗
t )
2
]
= E
[
(BTt+1
ht+1
γ
Σ−1t µtX
u¯∗
t )
2
]
Recall that
hT = 1,
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and
hT−1 = AT−1 +
1
γ
µTT−1Σ
−1
T−1µT−1.
then
ht+1 = Dt+1 +
1
γ
T−1∑
i=t+1
Dt+1
Di+1
µTi Σ
−1
i µi <∞.
Under the independence assumption, Σt and µt are constant, and Bt+1 is inde-
pendent from the filtration Ft, so is independent from Xt.
E
[
(BTt+1u
∗
t )
2
]
= E
[
(u∗t
TBt+1)
2
]
=
(ht+1
γ
)2
E
[
Σ−1t µ
T
t Bt+1B
T
t+1Σ
−1
t µt(X
u¯∗
t )
2
]
=
(ht+1
γ
)2
Σ−1t µ
T
t E
[
Bt+1B
T
t+1(X
u¯∗
t )
2
]
Σ−1t µt
=
(ht+1
γ
)2
Σ−1t µ
T
t E
[
Bt+1B
T
t+1
]
Σ−1t µtE
[
(X u¯
∗
t )
2
]
Since the mean and variance of Bt is well-defined, then the second moment is
finite and (ht+1
γ
)2
Σ−1t µ
T
t E
[
Bt+1B
T
t+1
]
Σ−1t µt <∞
Hence, we start with a constant initial wealth X0 = x0, it implies that the equilib-
rium control u0 is admissible. As a result, the process X1 will be square-integrable
and E
[
(BT2 u
∗
1)
2
]
< ∞. Again, this implies that u1 is admissible. Therefore, we
follow this procedure until the maturity T and obtain the admissible equilibrium
control law {u0, u1, . . . , uT−1}.
3.4 Convergence of discrete open-loop control
for Black-Scholes model
In this section, we demonstrate the method for finding the open-loop equilibrium
control in continuous setting through discrete approximation. For the sake of
simplicity, we assume the risk-free rate is 0 and the dynamic of risky assets
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follows:
dSt = µStdt+ σStdWt,
where Wt is a Brownian motion and t ∈ [0, T ]. Denote ut as the amount of money
invested in stock market at time t, then the wealth process (Xt)t≥0 follows:
dXt =
ut
St
dSt.
Assume the investor aims to maximise the functional:
J(t, xt;u) = xtEt[X
u
T ]−
γ
2
V art(X
u
T ),
where γ is a positive constant.
We can discretise the time horizon into N partitions with equal sub-interval ∆t.
Denote ∆t = T
N
, then for i ∈ {0, . . . , N − 1}, the discretised dynamics of the
stock price and wealth process follow:
Si∆t = S0 exp
(
(µ− σ
2
2
)i∆t+ σWi∆t
)
,
and
X(i+1)∆t = Xi∆t + (
S(i+1)∆t
Si∆t
− 1)ui.
We know A = e0 = 1, and for i ∈ {0, . . . , N − 1}, we have
B∆ti+1 =
S(i+1)∆t
Si∆t
− 1 = exp((µ− σ2
2
)∆t+ σ(W(i+1)∆t −Wi∆t)
)− 1
= exp
(
(µ− σ
2
2
)∆t+ ση∆t
)− 1
where η∆t is normal random variable with mean 0 and variance ∆t. We notice
that B∆ti is indeed identically distributed, then we will omit the index i. From the
results Corollary 3.3.6 from previous section, the open-loop equilibrium strategy
is given by
u∗i =
E[B∆t]
γhi+1Var(B∆t)
xi (3.12)
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and
hi = hi+1 +
E[B∆t]2
γV ar(B∆t)
, for i ∈ {0, . . . , N − 1}.
Denote that ξ∆t =
E[B∆t]2
γV ar(B∆t)
, then
hi = hi+1 + ξ∆t
= hT + (N − i)ξ∆t
= 1 + (N − i)ξ∆t
for i ∈ {0, . . . , T − 1}, and
ξ∆t =
E[
S(i+1)∆t
Si∆t
− 1]2
γV ar(
S(i+1)∆t
Si∆t
− 1)
=
E
[
exp((µ− σ2
2
) + ση∆t)− 1
]2
γV ar
(
exp((µ− σ2
2
) + ση∆t)
)
=
(eµ∆t − 1)2
γe2µ∆t{eσ2∆t − 1} .
For any t ∈ [0, T ], denote k = b t
∆t
c, then k ·∆t ≤ t < (k + 1) ·∆t. Next, we will
show that as N tends to infinity, hk and hk+1 will tend to same limit,
lim
N→∞
hk = lim
∆t→0
hk
= 1 + lim
∆t→0
ξ∆t(N − k)
= 1 +
1
γ
lim
∆t→0
E[B∆t]2
V ar(B∆t)
· ( T
∆t
− k)
= 1 +
1
γ
lim
∆t→0
E[B∆t]2
∆t · V ar(B∆t) ·
(
T − k ·∆t)
= 1 +
1
γ
lim
∆t→0
(eµ∆t − 1)2
∆t · e2µ∆t{eσ2∆t − 1} ·
(
T − k ·∆t).
36
3.4 Convergence of discrete open-loop control for Black-Scholes model
By L’Hoˆpital’s rule, we have
lim
∆t→0
(eµ∆t − 1)2
∆te2µ∆t{eσ2∆t − 1} = lim∆t→0
1− 2e−µ∆t + e−2µ∆t
(eσ2∆t − 1) ·∆t
L’Hoˆpital
= lim
∆t→0
2µe−µ∆t − 2µe−2µ∆t
σ2eσ2∆t∆t+ eσ2∆t − 1
L’Hoˆpital
= lim
∆t→0
−2µ2e−µ∆t + 4µ2e−2µ∆t
∆t · σ4eσ2∆t + σ2eσ2∆t + σ2eσ2∆t
=
µ2
σ2
.
Hence, we have
lim
N→∞
h∆tk = 1 +
µ2
γσ2
lim
∆t→0
(T − k ·∆t)
= 1 +
µ2
γσ2
lim
∆t→0
(
T − b t
∆t
c ·∆t)
= 1 +
µ2
γσ2
(T − t).
Similarly, since ξ∆t does not depend on the index k, then
lim
N→∞
hk+1 = 1 +
µ2
γσ2
lim
∆t→0
(
T − (k + 1) ·∆t)
= 1 +
µ2
γσ2
(T − t).
As N goes to infinity, the mapping t→ ht is now in continuous time, then
ht = 1 +
µ2
γσ2
(T − t),
and
u∗t =
µ
γ · (1 + µ2
γσ2
(T − t))σ2Xt
=
µ
γσ2 + µ2(T − t)Xt. (3.13)
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Remark. In (Hu et al., 2012, Section 5.4.1), the continuous open-loop equilibrium
control for the same problem is found to be:
u∗t =
µ
γ Mt σ2
Xt (3.14)
where
Mt = 1 +
µ2
γσ2
(T − t).
which is the limit of the control for discrete framework as shown above.
3.5 Conclusion
This chapter has introduced a definition of discrete time open-loop equilibrium
strategy. Under the discrete time open-loop definition 3.3.1, the relationship per-
turbed wealth process and unperturbed wealth process has been identified by
equation (3.3). From the equation (3.3) the rationale of the open-loop equilib-
rium is that the investor tests a perturbed strategy against current investment
plan by deviating a small amount of stock investment ε over a single-period. In
particular, the investor has two objectives: short-term investment and long-term
investment plans. The short-term investment plan (e.g. the term Dt+1B
T
t+1ε in
equation (3.3)) for open-loop equilibrium investor is to invest in stock market for
one period. After one period, the investor will withdraw this investment from
stock market and deposit it into the bank account until the maturity.
The second focus of the research is to obtain the necessary and sufficient condi-
tion (Theorem 3.3.2 and Theorem 3.3.3) for open-loop equilibrium strategy. It
has been shown that the type of perturbation does not affect the resulting equi-
librium strategy in discrete time. Moreover, given the specific matrix inversion
is well-defined,Theorem 3.3.3 shows that the open-loop equilibrium strategy is of
linear feedback type and is unique. Therefore, there exists only one open-loop
strategy for multiplicative wealth dynamic. The feasibility of the solution has
been provided by Corollary 3.3.4 with bounded excess return factor Bt.
The condition obtained for open-loop can be used for generating a numerical algo-
rithm for constructing an open-loop equilibrium control. It has been shown that
the open-loop equilibrium strategy we developed in this chapter approximates
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the continuous version of open-loop equilibrium strategy by Hu et al. (2012) in
Black-Scholes model. Providing the uniqueness result for continuous open-loop
equilibrium strategy from Hu et al. (2015), it verifies that our interpretation of the
open-loop investor’s rationale coincides with the original open-loop equilibrium
definition. However, for the Black-Scholes example presenting in this chapter, it
has be noticed that the value of Mt strictly increases as (T − t) increases. This
implies that the open-loop equilibrium strategy u∗t in equation (3.14) decays as
time t goes backward. We will discuss these issues in Chapter 6.2.
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Chapter 4
Closed-loop equilibrium strategy
in discrete time
4.1 Introduction
In Bjork & Murgoci (2014), the authors study the closed-loop equilibrium strat-
egy in discrete time. Since the closed-loop was first developed for Markovian
system, the perturbation is defined as the deterministic function of current time
and wealth state. It is expected that, when the investor deviates from the strat-
egy slightly, there exists a chain reaction on the future perturbations. Based
on such hypothesis, we will present a similar perturbation method as shown in
Chapter 3. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the investment amount of initial open-
loop equilibrium strategy goes to 0 as the investment length goes to infinity. A
similar phenomenon has been observed for closed-loop equilibrium strategy in all
existing studies. Therefore, this chapter will study the asymptotic behaviour of
closed-loop equilibrium strategy as investment length goes to infinity.
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4.2 Formulation of the problem and preliminar-
ies
In this chapter, we will study the same problem as in Chapter 3.2. Recall the
aim of investor from equation 3.2:
ess sup
u¯
{
XtEt[X
u¯
T ]−
γ
2
Vart[X
u¯
T ]
}
, (4.1)
subject to the wealth dynamic
X u¯t+1 = AtX
u¯
t + B
T
t+1ut, (4.2)
where At = e
r0t and Bt+1 := [B
1
t+1, B
2
t+1, . . . , B
n
t+1]
T = [(b1t+1 − er0t ), (b2t+1 −
er
0
t ), . . . , (bnt+1−er0t )]T . However, compared to the previous chapter, we will study
the problem within the Markovian framework. Markovian framework implies the
stock price admitting a strong Markov property. Since under the strong Marko-
vian property, the stock price at time t is independent of the prices at time s with
s < t. This suggests us to concentrate on the feedback type of the strategies.
Now we will introduce the definition of feedback strategy and the equilibrium
condition. Also, we will use the upper case U¯ to denote the strategy of feedback
type in Markovian setting to distinguish it from the notation of open-loop strat-
egy in general setting. Recall that (Ft) is the filtration generated by stock prices
(Sk)k∈0,...,t.
Definition 4.2.1. A sequence U¯t ≡ (Ut, . . . , UT−1) of random functions: Ω×R→
Rn in is a admissible feedback strategy for an initial wealth xt ∈ L2(Ft) if
i Us is
Fs⊗B(R)
B(Rn) -measurable for s = t, . . . , T − 1.
ii the wealth process defined as XU¯s+1 = AsX
U¯
s +B
T
s+1Us(X
U¯
s ) satisfies X
U¯
s ∈
L2(Fs) for s = t, . . . , T − 1.
If stock price is a Markov process, then we introduce an obvious specialisation
of the above definition. For the sake of simplicity, notations remain the same as
previously assigned.
41
4.2 Formulation of the problem and preliminaries
Definition 4.2.2. A sequence U¯t ≡ (Ut, . . . , UT−1) of function R×(0,∞)n → Rn
is a admissible Markovian feedback strategy for an initial wealth Xt ∈ L2(Ft) if
i Us is
B(R)⊗B(Rn)
B(Rn) -measurable for s = t, . . . , T − 1.
ii the wealth process defined as XU¯s+1 = AsX
U¯
s +B
T
s+1Us(X
U¯
s ) satisfies X
U¯
s ∈
L2(Fs) for s = t, . . . , T − 1.
Definition 4.2.3. The wealth process (X
U¯t,xt
s )s=t,...,T for a feedback strategy U¯t
and initial wealth Xt ∈ L2(Ft) is defined as follows:
X
U¯t,xt
t = Xt,
X
U¯t,xt
s+1 = AsX
U¯t,xt
s +B
T
s+1Us(X
U¯t,xt
s ), s = t, . . . , T − 1.
For the simpilicity of notation, we will often omit the dependence on Xt and U¯t.
Definition 4.2.4. For an admissible feedback strategy U¯t and an intial wealth
xt, its performance is defined as
J(t, xt; U¯t) = XtEt[X
U¯t,xt
T ]−
γ
2
Vart[X
U¯t,xt
T ].
Definition 4.2.5. An admissible feedback strategy U¯∗ ≡ U¯∗0 for the initial
wealth x0 is a closed-loop equilibrium control if for any t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T − 1}
and for any bounded Rn-valued Ft-measurable random variable ε, we have
J(t, xU¯
∗
t ; U¯
ε
t)− J(t, xU¯
∗
t ; U¯
∗
t ) ≤ 0 a.s.,
where U¯∗ = (U∗t , U
∗
t+1 . . . , U
∗
T−1) and U¯
ε = (U∗t + ε, U
∗
t+1, . . . , U
∗
T−1).
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4.3 Closed-loop strategy for mean-variance
problem
Note that the definition of closed-loop equilibrium stands in sharp contrast with
open-loop equilibrium from the perturbed strategy. The deviation term ε at time
t will affect the future strategies {Us} for s = t + 1, . . . , T − 1. An explanation
for this difference is: when the open-loop investor decides to test the strategy
by a perturbation at time t, due to the nature of general dynamic system, he
could not examine the future influence arising by this perturbation after time
t+ 1. Therefore, he would like to have a “blind” test against the present control
strategy. However, in Markovian system, the future dynamic generated by the
perturbation can be tracked and the investor can adjust the future strategies
corresponding to this perturbation.
Theorem 4.3.1. Let control sequence {U¯s(XU¯s , Ss)}s=0,...,T−1 be a closed-loop
equilibrium control for problem (4.1) under the wealth dynamic (4.2). Then the
equilibrium control U¯ admits a separable form of
U¯t = K(t)Xt, for t = 0, . . . , T − 1.
Furthermore, let
KT−1 =
1
γ
ET−1[BT ]Cov−1T−1(BT ),
and, for t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 2,
Kt = Cov
−1
t (Gt+1Bt+1)
(1
γ
Et[Bt+1Gt+1]− AtCovt
)
where
Gt =
T−1∏
i=t
(Ai + B
T
i+1Ki), for t = 1, 2, . . . , T − 1. (4.3)
Assume that (Kt) is well-defined, i.e., CovT−1(BT ) and Covt(Gt+1Bt+1) are
a.s. invertible and all the expectations exist. Define a feedback control U¯∗ =
(U∗0 , U
∗
1 , . . . , U
∗
T−1) by
U∗t (x) = Ktx.
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i If XU¯
∗,1
T ∈ L2(FT ), then U¯∗ is a unique equilibrium closed-loop feedback
control for any initial wealth x0 ∈ R \ {0}.
ii If XU¯
∗,1
T /∈ L2(FT ), then there is no equilibrium closed-loop feedback control
for any x0 ∈ R \ {0}.
Proof. We will prove the above result using mathematical induction. At time
T − 1, recall DT = 1, the closed-loop equilibrium strategy coincides with the
single-period optimal control, which is given by
UT−1 =
µT−1
γ
Σ−1T−1XT−1,
where ΣT−1 = CovT−1[BT ] and µT−1 = ET−1[BT ]. Therefore, at time T − 1, the
closed-loop equilibrium control is in the form:
UT−1 = KT−1XT−1,
where KT−1 = 1γµT−1Σ
−1
T−1. Assume Us follow the expression KsXs for all s ∈
{t + 1, . . . , T − 1}, then the dynamics (4.2) allow for explicit expression for the
terminal wealth. For convenience, we also set Dt =
∏T−1
i=1 Ai and recall that is a
deterministic quantity. Given Xt ∈ L2(Ft) at time t and a separable admissible
control U¯t, for a perturbed control U¯
ε
t we have
X
U¯εT
T = AT−1X
U¯ε
T−1 + B
T
TU
ε
T−1(X
U¯ε
T−1) = (AT−1 + B
T
TKT−1)X
U¯ε
T−1
=
T−1∏
i=t+1
(Ai + B
T
i+1Ki)X
U¯ε
t+1
=
T−1∏
i=t+1
(Ai + B
T
i+1Ki)(AtXt + B
T
t+1U
ε
t)
=
T−1∏
i=t+1
(Ai + B
T
i+1Ki)
(
AtXt + B
T
t+1(Ut + ε)
)
= XU¯T + B
T
t+1ε
T−1∏
i=t+1
(Ai + B
T
i+1Ki) (4.4)
Here,to obtain the expression (4.4), we use the induction hypothesis that the
strategies (Ut+1, . . . , UT−1) admit the form Us = KsXs for s ∈ {t+ 1, . . . , T − 1}.
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Next, we will prove the closed-loop equilibrium control at time t obtains the
same expression. Fix an admissible strategy U¯ and its perturbed version U¯ε
with a deterministic perturbation ε ∈ Rn applied at time t. Recalling expression
(4.4)-(4.3), we have
Et[X
U¯,ε
T ] = Et[X
U¯
T ] + Et[B
T
t+1Gt+1]ε.
For variance term, we have
Vart[X
U¯ε
T ] = Vart[X
U¯
T + B
T
t+1Gt+1ε]
= Vart[X
U¯
T ] + 2ε
TCovt(X
U¯
T ,B
T
t+1Gt+1) + ε
TCovt[Bt+1Gt+1]ε
By the definition 4.2.5, we have
J(t,XU¯t ; U¯
ε)− J(t,XU¯t ; U¯)
= XtEt[B
T
t+1Gt+1]ε− γεTCovt(XU¯T ,BTt+1Gt+1)−
γ
2
εTCovt[Bt+1Gt+1]ε. (4.5)
For U¯ to be a closed-loop equilibrium strategy, the above expression has to be
a.s. non-positive for any ε. We assume CovT−1(BT ) and Covt(Gt+1Bt+1) are a.s.
invertible and all the expectations exist. The above expression is strictly concave
in ε. The condition of non-positivity is satisfied if and only if the maximum is at
ε = 0. Due to the concavity, the first order condition is necessary and sufficient.
The derivative with respect to ε evaluated at ε = 0 reads
XtEt[Bt+1Gt+1]− γCovt(XU¯T ,BTt+1Gt+1) = 0 (4.6)
Recall that the structure of separable control Us = KsXs for s ∈ {t+1, . . . , T−1},
then given Xt ∈ L2(Ft) at time t and an admissible control U¯t we have
XT = Gt+1(AtXt + B
T
t+1Ut)
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By the first order condition (4.6), we have
0 = XU¯t Et[Bt+1Gt+1]− γCovt
(
Gt+1(AtXt + B
T
t+1Ut),B
T
t+1Gt+1
)
= XU¯t Et[Bt+1Gt+1]−XtAtγCovt
(
Gt+1,B
T
t+1Gt+1
)
− γCovt
(
Gt+1B
T
t+1,B
T
t+1Gt+1
)
Ut
Since Covt
(
Gt+1B
T
t+1,B
T
t+1Gt+1
)
is positive definite, then Ut has to satisfy
Ut = Cov
−1
t
(
Gt+1Bt+1
)(1
γ
Et[Bt+1Gt+1]− AtCovt(Gt+1,BTt+1Gt+1)
)
Xt.
Inserting it into (4.5) gives
J(t,XU¯t ; U¯
ε
t)− J(t,XU¯t ; U¯t) = −
γ
2
εTVart[Bt+1Gt+1]ε,
which is non-positive for all ε. Now, we relax ε to be a bounded Ft-measurable
random variable. Due to positive definiteness of Vart[Bt+1Gt+1], the above ex-
pression is non-positive if and only if ε ≡ 0.
It can be seen that, the closed-loop equilibrium control Ut = KtXt where
Kt = Cov
−1
t
(
Gt+1Bt+1
)(1
γ
Et[Bt+1Gt+1]− AtCovt(Gt+1,BTt+1Gt+1)
)
.
Therefore, by the mathematical induction, the equilibrium strategy U¯ admits a
separable form of
U¯t = K(t)Xt, for t = 0, . . . , T − 1.
Remark. It can be seen in Theorem 4.3.1 that the closed-loop equilibrium control
at time t depends on the entire future choices for {t+1, . . . , T−1} via K. However,
the investor decides the closed-loop control recursively. Compared with open-loop
equilibrium control, the separable structure and the recursive construction ensure
46
4.3 Closed-loop strategy for mean-variance problem
the uniqueness of the solution. Therefore, the following result can be concluded.
Corollary 4.3.2. There exists a unique closed-loop equilibrium control U¯∗t sat-
isfying
U∗t = Covt(Gt+1B
T , Gt+1)
−1(1
γ
Et[Bt+1Gt+1]− AtCovt(Gt+1)
)
XU¯t ,
where
Gt =
T−1∏
i=t
(Ai + B
T
i+1Ki).
Corollary 4.3.3. Assume Bt, t ∈ {1, . . . , T} are independent random variables
with the mean µt and the covariance matrix Σt. A unique closed-loop equilibrium
strategy U¯∗ is given by
U∗t =
(
βt+1(Σt + µtµ
T
t )− α2t+1µtµTt
)−1(1
γ
αt+1µt − At(βt+1 − α2t+1)µt
)
XU¯t
(4.7)
where the function α and β are given by the following recursive equations
αt = (At + µ
T
t Kt)αt+1, αT = 1,
and
βt = (A
2
t + K
T
t (Σt + µtµ
T
t )Kt + 2Atµ
T
t Kt)βt+1, βT = 1.
Proof. If Bi’s are independent, then
Et[Gt+1Bt+1] =
T−1∏
i=t+1
(Ai +E[Bi+1]
TKi])E[Bt+1]
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and
Covt(Gt+1, Gt+1Bt+1) = E[G
2
t+1]E[Bt+1]− (E[Gt+1])2E[Bt+1].
Denote αt+1 := E[Gt+1] and βt+1 := E[G
2
t+1], then
αt = E[Gt] = E[(At + B
T
t+1Kt)Gt+1] = (At + µ
T
t Kt)αt+1
and
βt = E[G
2
t ] = E[(At + Bt+1Kt)
2G2t+1]
= (A2t + K
T
t (Σt + µtµ
T
t )Kt + 2Atµ
T
t Kt)βt+1
with
αT = 1 and βT = 1.
Hence, the closed-loop equilibrium control becomes
U∗t =
(
βt+1(Σt + µtµ
T
t )− α2t+1µtµTt
)−1(1
γ
αt+1µt − At(βt+1 − α2t+1)µt
)
XU¯t
Remark 4.3.4. Suppose there is one risky asset with independent and identical
increment, then 4.3.3 is the same as the construction in Bjork & Murgoci (2014).
4.4 Asymptotic behaviour of closed-loop con-
trol
Corollary 4.3.3 provides a recursive way to construct a closed-loop equilibrium
control. Such construction allows us to determine the control for infinite time
backwards. Since the equilibrium strategy is designed for long-term investors,
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it is important to investigate the behaviour as time goes back. For the sake of
simplicity, we will assume that there is only one risky asset where the log returns
are independently and identically distributed. Meanwhile, the risk-free asset has
a constant return which implies At = e
r0t = A = constant > 1.
Recall Ut is a closed-loop equilibrium strategy in the form of
Ut = Kt Xt.
where t denote the time to maturity T . In the independent and identical case,
Kt+1 =
1
γ
αtµ− A
{
βtµ− α2tµ
}
βt(σ2 + µ2)− α2tµ2
where
αt+1 = (A+ µKt+1)αt, α0 = 1
and
βt+1 =
(
A2+(σ2+µ2)K2t+1+2AµKt+1
)
βt =
(
(A+µKt+1)
2+σ2K2t+1
)
βt, β0 = 1.
From here, in order to simplify the notations, we can rewrite Kt+1 by dividing
both the numerator and denominator by µ2,
Kt+1 =
1
µ
·
1
γ
αt − A
{
βt − α2t
}
βt(
σ2
µ2
+ 1)− α2t
,
and also write α and β as,
αt+1 =
(
A+
1
γ
αt − A
{
βt − α2t
}
βt(
σ2
µ2
+ 1)− α2t
)
αt,
and
βt+1 =
((
A+
1
γ
αt − A
{
βt − α2t
}
βt(
σ2
µ2
+ 1)− α2t
)2
+
σ2
µ2
( 1γαt − A{βt − α2t}
βt(
σ2
µ2
+ 1)− α2t
)2)
βt.
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Denote
φ =
σ2
µ2
, (4.8)
then
Kt+1 =
dt+1
µ
, (4.9)
where
dt+1 =
1
γ
αt − A
{
βt − α2t
}
βt(φ+ 1)− α2t
, (4.10)
then
αt+1 = (A+ dt+1)αt (4.11)
and
βt+1 =
(
(A+ dt+1)
2 + φ d2t+1
)
βt (4.12)
Note that the behaviour of closed-loop equilibrium control Kt+1 is the same as
the behaviour of dt+1 by a constant scaling factor. The main difficulty is the
nested dependence between the variables d, α, β and a constant φ. It can be
seen that φ is the inverse value of Sharpe ratio square. Therefore, the behaviour
of closed-loop control depends on the value of the Sharpe ratio. Note that the
expression (4.10) can be also written as:
dt+1 =
1
γ
αt
βt
− A{1− α2t
βt
}
(φ+ 1)− α2t
βt
. (4.13)
Lemma 4.4.1.
α2t
βt
is monotonically decreasing as t increases, that is
α2t+1
βt+1
≤ α2t
βt
for all t and the equality holds iff d1 = 0. Also, there exists a constant c1 < 1
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such that
α2t
βt
≤ α
2
1
β1
= c1 < 1.
Proof. Since φd2t ≥ 0, then
α2t+1
βt+1
=
(A+ dt+1)
2
(A+ dt+1)2 + φd2t+1
α2t
βt
≤ α
2
t
βt
and the above equality holds only if dt+1 = 0. It is easy to verify that the base
value
d1 =
1
γφ
6= 0.
So,
α21
β1
=
(A+ d1)
2
(A+ d1)2 + φd21
α20
β0
<
α20
β0
= 1.
Remark 4.4.1. Lemma 4.4.1 shows the ratio of
α2t
βt
is strictly less than 1 for all t
and will always decrease unless the value dt+1 = 0. Therefore, the denominator of
equation (4.13) is strictly positive. The sign of dt only depends on the numerator
of equation (4.13)
Lemma 4.4.2. There exists a t∗ such that dt < 0 for all t > t∗.
Proof. Assume that dt ≥ 0 for all t, then
αt+1
βt+1
=
A+ dt+1
(A+ dt+1)2 + φ d2t+1
· αt
βt
=
1
(A+ dt+1) +
φ d2t+1
A+dt+1
· αt
βt
≤ 1
A
αt
βt
Next, we will show that αt
βt
tends to 0 as t increases. Since all dt ≥ 0 for all t, the
above denominator
(A+ dt) +
φd2t
A+ dt
> 1.
Therefore, there exists a δ 6= 0 such that
1 ≥ 1
(A+ dt) +
φ d2t
A+dt
+
δ
(A+ dt) +
φ d2t
A+dt
.
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Since all dt ≥ 0 for all t, then the above denominator
(A+ dt) +
φd2t
A+ dt
> 1.
Since αt
βt
≤ 1 and 0 < α2t
β2t
< 1, then
dt =
1
γ
− A+ Aα2t
βt
φ+ 1− α2t
βt
≤
1
γ
φ
= d1.
Therefore, dt is bounded above by d1 =
1
γφ
, and δ
(A+dt)+
φ d2t
A+dt
is strictly bounded
away from 0. Hence, limt→∞ αtβt = 0. Now,
lim
t→∞
dt = lim
t→∞
1
γ
· αt
βt
− A(1− α2t
βt
)
φ+ 1− α2t
βt
≤ lim
t→∞
1
γ
· αt
βt
− A(1− c1)
φ+ 1− α2t
βt
= lim
t→∞
1
γ
· αt
βt
φ+ 1− α2t
βt
− lim
t→∞
A(1− c1)
φ+ 1− α2t
βt
≤ −A (1− c1)
φ+ 1
< 0.
This contradicts the positivity of dt for all t.
Remark 4.4.2. Lemma 4.4.2 shows the closed-loop equilibrium control can attain
a negative values when t is sufficient large. The following lemma will state a
lower bound for the equilibrium control.
Lemma 4.4.3. There exists a lower bound, −A, such that dt > −A and αt, βt >
0 for all t.
Proof. By Lemma 4.4.1, in the formula (4.10), the denominator is positive. Hence
dt+1 > −A is equivalent to
1
γ
αt
βt
− A (1− α
2
t
βt
) > −A (φ+ 1− α
2
t
βt
),
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which is
αt
γβt
> −Aφ.
As βt is strictly positive for all t, then it is sufficient to show αt > 0. This is true
because α0 = 1 implies d1 > −A and the relation (4.11) states for all t
αt+1 = (A+ dt)αt.
This ensures α1 > 0 and by using induction, αt is positive for all t, which com-
pletes the proof.
As we mentioned, the limit of closed-loop equilibrium control depends on the
Sharpe ratio. For a specific range of Sharpe ratio, the limit of equilibrium control
can be provided.
Lemma 4.4.4. If φ > 1
4A(A−1) , then Θt :=
1
γ
αt
βt
+ A
α2t
βt
→ 0 and dt → −Aφ+1 as
t→∞.
Proof. Firstly, recall the expression (4.13) of dt
dt+1 =
1
γ
αt
βt
− A{1− α2t
βt
}
(φ+ 1)− α2t
βt
, (4.14)
showing the limit of dt is equivalent to study the limit of
αt
βt
and
α2t
βt
We will show
that,
αt
βt
→ 0, as t→∞.
Then, for φ > 1
4A(A−1) ,
(A+ dt)
2 + φd2t − (A+ dt) > 0 for all real value dt.
Providing the value of φ, there exists a δ > 0 such that
(A+ dt)
2 + φd2t − (A+ dt) ≥ δ.
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Recall the equation (4.11) and (4.12) we have
αt+1
βt+1
=
(A+ dt)
(A+ dt)2 + φd2t
αt
βt
.
Then, we have
(A+ dt)
(A+ dt)2 + φd2t
≤ 1− δ
(A+ dt)2 + φd2t
.
To show the limit of αt
βt
is equivalent to have (A+dt)
(A+dt)2+φd2t
being strictly bounded
away from 1 by a constant. However, it is not clear now as dt can be arbitrarily
large. Hence, we need to prove that the limit of supremum of dt is bounded.
Since Lemma 4.4.3 shows αt
βt
≤ 1
A
α0
β0
≤ 1 and Lemma 4.4.1 shows 0 < α2t
βt
≤ 1,
then
dt =
1
γ
αt
βt
− A+ Aα2t
βt
φ+ 1− α2t
βt
≤
1
γ
φ
= d0 <∞ for all t.
Therefore, there exists a δ˜ > 0 such that
1− δ˜ ≥ A+ dt
(A+ dt)2 + φd2t
,
and
lim
t→∞
αt
βt
= 0.
Next, we will find the limit of
α2t
βt
. Lemma 4.4.1 and Lemma 4.4.3 show that
α2t
βt
is a monotonic decreasing sequence which is bounded below by 0. Then there is
κ ∈ (0, 1)
lim
t→∞
α2t
βt
= κ.
54
4.4 Asymptotic behaviour of closed-loop control
Then,
lim sup
t→∞
Θt = 0 + Aκ < A.
This implies dt is bounded away from 0 for sufficiently large t, since
lim sup
t→∞
dt = lim sup
t→∞
1
γ
αt
βt
− A{1− α2t
βt
}
(φ+ 1)− α2t
βt
=
1
φ+ 1− κ
(
lim sup
t→∞
Θt − A
)
< 0.
Then, from Lemma 4.4.1, we have κ = 0. For sufficient large t, there is an η < 1
such that
α2t+1
βt+1
=
1
1 +
φd2t
(A+dt)2
α2t
βt
≤ ηα
2
t
βt
.
Therefore,
lim
t→∞
Θt → 0
and
lim
t→∞
dt =
−A
1 + φ
.
Note that it is also important to explore the case when Sharpe ratio is outside
of above range. By analysing the different range of Sharpe ratio, the different
investment behaviour can be studied. Recall that αt represents the dynamics of
the first moment of wealth process, then dt + A shows the expected investment
return or loss over a single period. Therefore, we will focus on the cases when
dt + A > 1 and dt + A < 1.
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Lemma 4.4.5. Assume A+ dt ≥ 1, then dt+1 < dt.
Proof. Equation (4.10) is equivalent to
1
γ
αt + (A+ dt)α
2
t = (dtφ+ dt + A)βt. (4.15)
To show dt+1 < dt, it is equivalent to show
1
γ
αt+1 − A(βt+1 − α2t+1)
βt+1(φ+ 1)− α2t+1
≤ dt. (4.16)
Lemma 4.4.1 provides the denominator is positive, then the above inequal-
ity (4.15) can be rearranged as:
LHS of (4.15) =
1
γ
αt+1 + Aα
2
t+1 + dtα
2
t+1
=
1
γ
(A+ dt)αt + A(A+ dt)
2α2t + dt(A+ dt)
2α2t (by the relation (4.11))
=
1
γ
(A+ dt)αt + (A+ dt)
3α2t
< RHS of (4.15)
= (dtφ+ dt + A) βt+1
= (dtφ+ dt + A)
(
(A+ dt)
2 + φ d2t
)
βt (by the relation (4.12))
=
(
(A+ dt)
2 + φ d2t
)(1
γ
αt + (A+ dt)α
2
t
)
(by equation (4.15))
=
1
γ
(A+ dt)
2αt + (A+ dt)
3α2t +
1
γ
φd2tαt + φd
2
t (A+ dt)α
2
t
Therefore, cancelling the above term (A+ dt)
3α2t , it suffices to show that
1
γ
(A+ dt) <
1
γ
(A+ dt)
2 +
1
γ
φd2tαt + φd
2
t (A+ dt)α
2
t
When (A+ dt) ≥ 1, then the above inequality is trivial.
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Remark 4.4.3. Under the assumption of Lemma 4.4.4 φ ≥ 1
A−1 , we have the limit
of dt is equal to
−A
1+φ
. As a result,
−A
1 + φ
+ A =
A
1 + 1
φ
≥ 1,
which is sufficient to show
A > 1 +
1
φ
⇔ φ > 1
A− 1 .
This is fulfilled by the assumption of Lemma 4.4.4. Providing Lemma 4.4.5, we
have a monotonic decreasing sequence dt converges to the limit
−A
1+φ
. We decide
to prove the behaviour of the closed-loop control for full generality (φ < 1
A−1)
in the next lemma. The proof of Lemma 4.4.6 will be needed in the remaining
results.
Lemma 4.4.6. Suppose φ ≥ 1
(A−1) . If dt + A ≥ 1, then
dt+1 + A ≥ 1.
Proof. We need to show
dt+1 =
1
γ
αt+1 − A(βt+1 − α2t+1)
βt+1(φ+ 1)− α2t+1
≥ 1− A.
Define
Λ(αt, βt) := −1
γ
αt+1 + A(βt+1 − α2t+1) + (1− A)
(
βt+1(φ+ 1)− α2t+1
)
.
Then, we have
Λ(αt, βt) = −1
γ
αt+1 − α2t+1 +
(
φ+ 1− Aφ)βt+1.
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From (4.11),
1
γ
αt+1 + α
2
t+1 =
1
γ
(A+ dt)αt + (A+ dt)
2α2t
= (A+ dt)
(1
γ
αt + (A+ dt)α
2
t
)
= (A+ dt)(dtφ+ dt + A)βt by equation (4.15).
Then,
Λ(αt, βt) = −(A+ dt)(dtφ+ dt + A)βt +
(
φ+ 1− Aφ)((A+ dt)2 + φd2t)βt.
By Lemma 4.4.3, we have βt > 0, then
dt+1 + A ≥ 1 ⇐⇒ Λ(dt)
βt
≤ 0.
We can expand the bracket and simplify the terms to obtain
Λ
βt
(dt) = d
2
tφ(φ+ 1)(1− A) + dtφA(1− 2A) + φA2(1− A)
Since A > 1, then Λ(dt)
βt
is a quadratic function in terms of dt with all the coef-
ficients being negative. It is trivial that Λ(dt)
βt
≤ 0 for all dt ≥ 0. Therefore, it
suffices to show Λ(dt)
βt
≤ 0 for dt ∈ [1−A, 0). We look at the discriminant of Λ(dt)βt :
∆ := A2φ2(1− 2A)2 − 4φ2A2(1− A)2(1 + φ).
If ∆ ≤ 0, then Λ(dt)
βt
≤ 0 for any dt, that is
∆ = A2φ2(1− 2A)2 − 4φ2A2(1− A)2(1 + φ) ≤ 0.
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The above inequality is true if
φ ≥ (1− 2A)
2
4(1− A)2 − 1
=
(1− 2A)2 − 4(1− A)2
4(1− A)2
=
4A− 3
4(1− A)2
=
1
A− 1 +
1
4(A− 1)2 .
If ∆ > 0, in which 1
A−1 +
1
4(A−1)2 > φ >
1
A−1 , then
d+t :=
−φA(1− 2A)−√∆
2φ(1− A)(1 + φ) ≤ (1− A)
This is equivalent to
−
√
∆ ≥ φA(1− 2A) + 2φ(1− A)(1− A)(1 + φ).
The above inequality requires the right-hand side to be negative,
φA(1− 2A) + 2φ(1− A)2(1 + φ) < 0,
that is
φ <
A(2A− 1)
2(A− 1)2 − 1
=
3
2(A− 1) +
1
2(A− 1)2
This is satisfied because φ < 1
A−1 +
1
4(A−1)2 <
3
2(A−1) +
1
2(A−1)2 . Squaring both
sides, we obtain
∆ ≤ φ2A2(1−2A)2+4φ2(1−A)2(1−A)2(1+φ)2+4φ2A(1−2A)(1−A)(1−A)(1+φ).
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Therefore,
A2φ2(1− 2A)2 − 4φ2A2(1− A)2(1 + φ)
≤ φ2A2(1− 2A)2 + 4φ2(1− A)2(1− A)2(1 + φ)2
+ 4φ2A(1− 2A)(1− A)(1− A)(1 + φ),
which leads to
− 4φ2A2(1− A)2(1 + φ)
≤ 4φ2(1− A)2(1− A)2(1 + φ)2 + 4φ2A(1− 2A)(1− A)(1− A)(1 + φ).
Dividing both side by 4φ2(1 + φ)(1− A),
−A2(1− A) ≥ (1− A)2(1− A)(1 + φ) + A(1− 2A)(1− A).
Therefore,
φ ≥ A
2(1− A) + A(1− 2A)(1− A)
(A− 1)(1− A)2 − 1
=
−A2 − A(1− 2A)
(A− 1)2 − 1
=
A(A− 1)
(A− 1)2 − 1
=
A
A− 1 − 1
=
1
A− 1 .
Recall that Λ(dt)
βt
≤ 0 for all dt ≥ 0. Therefore, it suffices to show Λ(dt)βt ≤ 0 for
dt ∈ [1−A, 0).In the case of d+t < 1−A, we have Λ(dt)βt ≤ 0 for any dt ∈ [1−A, 0),
which implies dt+1 + A ≥ 1.
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Lemma 4.4.7. Suppose φ < (A− 1)−1, if dt + A < 1, then
dt+1 + A < 1.
Proof. By Lemma 4.4.3 and Lemma 4.4.6 , it is equivalent to show that
Λ(dt)
βt
> 0, for dt ∈ (−A, 1− A),
where
Λ(dt)
βt
= d2tφ(φ+ 1)(1− A) + dtφA(1− 2A) + φA2(1− A).
Since φ < (A− 1)−1, the discriminant ∆ is positive. We will show that
Λ(−A)
βt
≥ 0 and Λ(1− A)
βt
≥ 0.
Since
Λ(−A)
βt
= A2φ(φ+ 1)(1− A)− AφA(1− 2A) + φA2(1− A) ≥ 0
if
(φ+ 1)(1− A)− (1− 2A) + (1− A) ≥ 0.
Meanwhile,
Λ(1− A)
βt
= (1− A)2φ(φ+ 1)(1− A) + (1− A)φA(1− 2A) + φA2(1− A) ≥ 0
if
(1− A)2(φ+ 1) + A(1− 2A) + A2 ≤ 0.
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Both inequalities are true since φ < 1
A−1 , which completes the proof.
Note that the lemma 4.4.5 and lemma 4.4.6 shows that, when the Sharp ratio
satisfies the condition φ > (A − 1)−1, the equilibrium strategy can be negative.
The expect return of investment is positive over every single period. Therefore, we
have a monotonic decreasing control sequence which is bounded below. However,
when the Sharp ratio satisfies the condition φ < (A − 1)−1, ds + A will be less
than 1 at some time t and ds+A is also less than 1 for all s > t. The phenomenon
shows the investor starts to lose money in the investment intentionally. This is
because when the time is far from the terminal and the expect excess return
is positive, the wealth is expected to be increased dramatically over a long time
period. As a result, the investor is losing money to stabilise the wealth trajectory.
4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we define the definition of feedback type strategy by 4.2.3.
Comparing to the work in Bjork & Murgoci (2014), the closed-loop equilibrium
strategy has been derived from a different perspective. The difference between
open-loop and closed-loop equilibrium investor lies in the short-term investment
plan. Comparing to the open-loop short-term plan, which is Dt+1B
T
t+1ε, the
short-term plan of the closed-loop equilibrium BTt+1
∏T−1
i=t+1(Ai + B
T
i+1Ki)ε is to
invest a small amount ε into stock market and leave this investment until the
maturity.
Taking the advantage of separable form (4.4) of terminal wealth, under the equi-
librium definition 4.2.5 and the assumption of invertibility in Lemma 4.3.1, we
obtain a necessary and sufficient condition for closed-loop equilibrium strategy
and the uniqueness of the solution in Lemma ?? and Lemma 4.3.1. We then
show such condition yields a linear feedback type strategy which coincides with
the equilibrium strategy in Bjork & Murgoci (2014) in one risky asset case.
We discuss the asymptotic behaviour of using the closed-loop equilibrium strategy
for mean-variance optimisation problem. The relation between the sharp ratio
and the asymptotic limit of closed-loop equilibrium strategy has been studied.
Firstly, Lemma 4.4.5 addresses the fact that the closed-loop equilibrium strategy
reduces the investment amount in risky asset as time goes backwards, which
is similar to the open-loop equilibrium strategy. Next, it has been shown in
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Lemma 4.4.2 that, for any mean and variance of excess return of risky asset, the
closed-loop will always short the stocks at some point of investment time period.
In particular, when the parameter φ = σ
2
µ2
> 1
4A(A−1) , Lemma 4.4.4 proves that
the asymptotic limit of closed-loop equilibrium strategy tends to − −A
φ+1
. It can
be seen that the above asymptotic limit is negative. Although the closed-loop
tends to such limit for all φ > 1
4A(A−1) , there exists a difference in the investment
behaviour with respect to the different values of φ. For φ ≥ 1
A−1 , Lemma 4.4.6
shows the expected excess return factor of the investment portfolio (A + dt) is
greater or equal to 1 in a single-period. This implies a positive excess return rate
of the investment portfolio. However, when 1
4A(A−1) < φ <
1
A−1 , Lemma 4.4.7
describes a situation where the investor has negative portfolio return.
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Chapter 5
Open-loop strategy in continuous
time setting
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we study the open-loop equilibrium for the linear-quadratic prob-
lem in continuous time, where the objective functional includes both a quadratic
term of the expected state and a state-dependent term. In previous chapters, it
has been shown that the perturbation plays an important role in determining the
type of equilibrium strategy. Therefore, the aim of this chapter is to explore the
equilibrium strategy in continuous time by choosing a different perturbation.
In Bjork & Murgoci (2010), the closed-loop equilibrium is obtained by setting the
perturbation as a deterministic function. In contrast, the open-loop equilibrium
is obtained by setting the perturbation as a square-integrable random variable.
In this chapter, we define an adapted process as the perturbation. The goal is to
study the impact of perturbation in continuous time setting.
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5.2 Theoretical framework
Let T > 0 be a finite time horizon and (Wt)0≤t≤T be a d-dimensional Brownian
motion on a probability space (Ω,F,P). The natural filtration of (Wt) is denoted
by Ft = {σ(Ws), 0 ≤ s ≤ t}.
For any time t ∈ [0, T ] and Xt = xt, we consider a stochastic linearly controlled
system:
dXs =
[
AsXs +B
T
s us + bs
]
ds+
d∑
i=1
[
CisXs +D
i
sus + σ
i
s
]
dW is ; ∀s ≥ t, (5.1)
where A : [0, T ] → Rn×n is a deterministic function. The coefficients B, Ci and
Di are essentially bounded adapted process on Ω×[0, T ] with values inRl×n,Rn×n
and Rn×l, respectively. The other processes b and σi are in L2F(t, T ;R
n), where
L2F(t, T ;R
n) is the space of {Fs}s∈[t,T ]-adapted processes ξ = {ξs; t ≤ s ≤ T} such
that E
[∫ T
t
|ξs|2 ds
]
< ∞. The process u ∈ L2F(t, T ;Rl) is called an admissible
control and its role is to control the dynamics of the diffusion (Xs)s∈[t,T ]. For any
x, y, we assume
∣∣Asx+BTs us + bs − Asy −BTs us − bs∣∣ ≤ ess sup
ω∈Ω,s∈[t,T ]
|As| |x− y|
and
|Csx+Dsus + σs − Csy −Dsus − σs| ≤ ess sup
ω∈Ω,s∈[t,T ]
|Cs| |x− y|
By Theorem 7, Section 2.5 in Krylov (2008), there exists a unique strong solution
Xs ∈ L2F(t, T ;Rn) of (5.1).
For any time t ∈ [0, T ] with the state Xt = xt with xt ∈ L2F(t, T ;Rn), we aim to
minimise the functional
J(t, xt;u) =
1
2
Et
∫ T
t
[QsX
2
s+Rsu
2
s]ds+
G
2
Et[X
2
T ]−
h
2
(Et[XT ])
2−(µ1xt+µ2)Et[XT ]
(5.2)
over the set of admissible controls, where X is the state process corresponding
to the control u and Et[·] denotes E[·|Ft]. Here Q and R are both non-negative
essentially bounded adapted processes and G, h, µ1, µ2 are constants with G being
non-negative.
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We notice that, this linear-quadratic functional can represent many different
types of problems. When Q and R are 0, the problem becomes a mean- variance
optimisation with state-dependent risk aversion. When h, µ1 and µ2 are 0, the
problem becomes an inventory problem with the stage cost and final stage cost.
Definition 5.2.1. Let u∗ be an admissible control and v ∈ L∞F (0, T ;Rl), where
L∞F (t, T ;R
l) is the space of {Fs}s∈[t,T ]-adapted processes ξ = {ξs; t ≤ s ≤ T}
such that ess supω∈Ω,s∈[t,T ] |ξs(ω)| < ∞. For any t ∈ [0, T ] and ε > 0, define the
perturbed control
ut,ε,vs = u
∗
s + vs1{s∈[t,t+ε)}. (5.3)
Let X t,ε,v and X∗ be the state processes corresponding to ut,ε,v and u∗, respec-
tively.
Definition 5.2.2. An admissible u∗ is called an open-loop equilibrium control if
lim inf
ε↓0
J(t,X∗t ;u
t,ε,v)− J(t,X∗t ;u∗)
ε
≥ 0, a.s. (5.4)
for any t ∈ [0, T ) and vs ∈ L∞F (0, T ;Rl).
5.3 Necessary and Sufficient Condition for
Equilibrium Controls
We will prove the above necessary and sufficient condition for u∗ ∈ L2F to be an
equilibrium control. Throughout this section, we will denote by X∗ the state
process corresponding to the control u∗.
Let us introduce notation used in this section. We will denote by
L2F(Ω;C(t, T ;R)) the space of continuous {Fs}s∈[t,T ]-adapted processes (ξs)t≤s≤T
such that E
{
sups∈[t,T ] |ξs|2
}
< ∞. We also extend standard order notation
to random variables. For a sequence of random variables ξε parametrised by
ε > 0, we write ξε = o(εk) if limε→0 ess sup
∣∣ ξε
εk
∣∣ = 0; and ξε = O(εk) if
limε→0 ess sup
∣∣ ξε
εk
∣∣ < c for some finite constant c.
For any t ∈ [0, T ], consider the following backward stochastic differential equa-
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tions:

dp(s; t) = −[Asp(s; t) + Csk(s; t) +QsX∗s ]ds+ k(s; t)TdWs, s ∈ [t, T ],
p(T ; t) = GX∗T − hEt[X∗T ]− µ1X∗t − µ2;
(5.5)

dPs = −[2AsPs + C2sPs + 2CsKs +Qs]ds+KTs dWs, s ∈ [t, T ],
PT = G.
(5.6)
Lemma 5.3.1. For any admissible control u∗, equations (5.5) and (5.6)
admit unique solutions (p(·; t), k(·; t)) ∈ L2F(Ω;C(t, T ;R)) × L2F(t, T ;R)
and (P (·), K(·)) ∈ L2F(Ω;C(t, T ;R)) × L2F(t, T ;R), respectively, where
L2F(Ω;C(t, T ;R)) is the space of continuous {Fs}s∈[t,T ]-adapted processes ξ =
{ξs; t ≤ s ≤ T} such that E
[
sups∈[t,T ] |ξs|2
]
< ∞. Moreover, Ps ≥ 0 a.s. for all
s ∈ [t, T ].
Proof. Denote g1(s, u, v) = Asu + Csv + QsX
∗
s and g
2(s, u, v) = 2Asu + C
2
sv +
2Csy + Qs. For any s ∈ [t, T ], g1(s, 0, 0) ∈ L2F(s, T ;R) and g2(s, 0, 0) ∈
L2F(s, T ;R). Moreover, it can be shown that g
1(s, u, v) and g2(s, u, v) are almost
surely uniformly Lipschitz with respect to (u, v). Therefore, according to Theo-
rem 1.1 El Karoui et al. (2008), there exist unique pairs of solutions (p(·; t), k(·; t))
and (P (·), K(·)) satisfying (5.5) and (5.6), respectively. Moreover, by Proposition
1.3 in El Karoui et al. (2008), we have Ps ≥ 0 a.s. for all s ∈ [t, T ].
Next, we will prove an important proposition which is very similar to the propo-
sition in Hu et al. (2012)[Proposition 3.1]. The reason for us to provide all the
details of the proof is that, firstly, in Hu et al. (2012), they refer to a theorem
in Yong & Zhou (1999) to prove the conditional expectation of supremum of the
processes Y and Z are in the O(ε) and O(ε2), respectively. However, the theorem
in Yong & Zhou (1999) does not have a conditional version of the proof, and
it only specifies the order for the supremum of the expectation. Secondly, our
definition of equilibrium control differs from the definition in Hu et al. (2012).
Therefore, we need to ensure that the proposition in Hu et al. (2012) still holds
in our case.
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Proposition 5.3.1. For any admissible control u∗, t ∈ [0, T ), ε > 0 and vs ∈
L∞F (t, T ;R),
J(t,X∗t ;u
t,ε,v)− J(t,X∗t ;u∗) = Et
∫ t+ε
t
{
Λ(s; t)vs +
1
2
Hsv
2
s
}
ds+ o(ε), (5.7)
where ut,ε,v is defined by (2.3); Λ(s; t) := Bsp(s; t) +Dsk(s; t) +Rsu
∗
s and Hs :=
Rs +D
2
sPs.
The proof of this proposition is comprised of a number of lemmas. The constant
C in the proofs may differ from line to line.
Define the processes Ys ≡ Y t,ε,vs and Zs ≡ Zt,ε,vs that satisfy

dYs = AsYsds+ [CsYs +Dsvs1{s∈[t,t+ε)}]dWs, s ∈ [t, T ],
Yt = 0;

dZs = [AsZs +Bsvs1{s∈[t,t+ε)}]ds+ CsZsdWs, s ∈ [t, T ],
Zt = 0;
Lemma 5.3.2. Let X t,ε,v be the state process corresponding to ut,ε,v, then
X t,ε,vs = X
∗
s + Ys + Zs, s ∈ [t, T ].
Proof. Since ut,ε,vs = u
∗
s + vs1{s∈[t,t+ε)}, for X
t,ε,v,
dX t,ε,v =
[
AsXs +B
T
s u
t,ε,v
s + bs
]
ds+
[
CsXs +Dsu
t,ε,v
s + σ
i
s
]
dWs,
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Set ηs = X
t,ε,v
s −X∗s − Ys − Zs, we have
dηs =
(
dX t,ε,vs − dX∗s
)− dYs − dZs
=
(
As(X
s,ε,v −Xs) +Bsvs1{s∈[t,t+ε)}
)
ds+
(
Cs(X
s,ε,v −Xs)Dsvs1{s∈[t,t+ε)}
)
dWs
− AsYsds− [CsYs +Dsvs1{s∈[t,t+ε)}]dWs − [AsZs +Bsvs1{s∈[t,t+ε)}]ds− CsZsdWs
= As(X
s,ε,v −Xs − Ys − Zs)ds+ Cs(Xs,ε,v −Xs − Ys − Zs)dWs
= Asηsds+ CsηsdWs.
Therefore, 
dηs = Asηsds+ CsηsdWs, s ∈ [t, T ],
ηt = 0.
This yields, ηs = 0 for all s ∈ [t, T ]
Lemma 5.3.3. Let L = max
(
ess sup |As|, ess sup |Cs|, ess sup |Ds|, ess sup |vs|
)
<
∞ be the maximum of essential suprema of the processes As, Cs, Ds and vs over
all ω ∈ Ω and s ∈ [t, T ]. The processes Et[Y 2ks ] and Et[Z2ks ] have continuous
trajectories with respect to s for any k ≥ 1. There exists a constant M depending
on r and L such that, for all t ∈ [0, T ]
sup
s∈[t,T ]
Et
[
Y 2rs
] ≤M · εr, sup
s∈[t,T ]
Et
[
Z2rs
] ≤M · ε2r a.s.
Proof. First we prove that Et[Y
2r
s ] is finite and s 7→ Et[Y 2rs ] is continuous (the
proof for Et[Z
2r
s ] is analogous). Since |AsYs| ≤ L |Ys| and
∣∣CsYs +Dsvs1{u∈[t,t+ε)}∣∣2 ≤ |Cs|2 |Ys|2 + ∣∣Dsvs1{u∈[t,t+ε)}∣∣2 + 2 ∣∣CsDsvs1{u∈[t,t+ε)}∣∣ |Ys|
≤ L2 |Ys|2 + L4 +
∣∣CsDsvs1{u∈[t,t+ε)}∣∣2 + |Ys|2
≤ (L4 + L6) + (1 + L2) |Ys|2 ,
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by Krylov (2008)[Corollary 10, Section 2.5], we have
E
[
sup
u∈[t,T ]
|Yu|2r
] ≤ N(r, L)T r−1eN(r,L)TE[∫ T
t
(L4 + L6)2rds], (5.8)
where N(r, L) is a constant depending only on r and L. This, in particular,
implies that Et[Y
2r
s ] <∞. To prove continuity of s 7→ Et[Y 2rs ], it is sufficient to
show that for any t1 ∈ [t, T ]
lim
t2→t1
(
Et[Y
2r
t2
]−Et[Y 2rt1 ]
)
= 0
over t2 ∈ [t, T ]. This follows by conditional dominated convergence theo-
rem (Williams, 1991, Lemma 9.7)
lim
t2→t1
(
Et[Y
2r
t2
]−Et[Y 2rt1 ]
)
= lim
t2→t1
Et
[
Y 2rt2 − Y 2rt1
]
= Et
[
lim
t2→t1
(Y 2rt2 − Y 2rt1 )
]
= 0 a.s.,
where the dominant
(
Y 2rt2 − Y 2rt1
) ≤ 2 sup
u∈[t,T ]
|Yu|2r a.s.
is integrable by (5.8).
The rest of the proof is concerned with establishing the bounds for superma of
conditional expectations of Y 2r and Z2r. Applying Itoˆ’s formula to the process
Y 2rs
dY 2rs =
[
2rAs + r(2r − 1)C2s
]
Y 2rs ds+ 2r(2r − 1)CsDsvs1{s∈[t,t+ε)}Y 2r−1s ds
+ r(2r − 1)(Dsvs)21{s∈[t,t+ε)}Y 2r−2s ds
+ 2r[CsYs +Dsvs1{s∈[t,t+ε)}]Y 2r−1s dWs.
Take s1 and δ such that t ≤ s1 < s1 + δ ≤ T . For s ∈ [s1, s1 + δ), integrate both
sides of the inequality from s1 to s and take the conditional expectation with
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respect to Ft to get
Et[Y
2r
s ] ≤ Et[Y 2rs1 ] + M˜
{
Et[
∫ s
s1
Y 2ru du]
+Et[
∫ s
s1
|Yu|2r−1 1{u∈[t,t+ε)}du] +Et[
∫ s
s1
Y 2r−2u 1{u∈[t,t+ε)}du]
}
+Et[
∫ s
s1
2r[CuYu +Duvu1{u∈[t,t+ε)}]Y 2r−1u dWu],
where
M˜ := max
{
2r · sup
s∈[t,T ]
|As|+ r(2r − 1) ess sup
s∈[t,T ]
|Cs|2 ,
2r(2r − 1) ess sup
s∈[t,T ]
|CsDsvs| , r(2r − 1) ess sup
s∈[t,T ]
|Dsvs|2
}
is a constant depending only on r and L. Since (Y lu) is square-integrable for all
l ≥ 1 (see the beginning of the proof) and (vu) is bounded, then the process
2r[CuYu + Duvu1{u∈[t,t+ε)}]Y 2r−1u is square-integrable. Therefore, the stochastic
integral is a martingale and it vanishes under the conditional expectation. By
Fubini’s theorem for conditional expectation we have
Et[Y
2r
s ] ≤ Et[Y 2rs1 ] + M˜
{∫ s
s1
Et[Y
2r
u ]du+
∫ s
s1
Et[|Yu|2r−1]1{u∈[t,t+ε)}du
+
∫ s
s1
Et[Y
2r−2
u ]1{u∈[t,t+ε)}du
}
.
Using Ho¨lder inequality for conditional expectations (Chen, 2006, p. 332), we
express lower conditional moments of Yu by the 2r-th moment:
Et[|Yu|2r−1] ≤
(
Et[Y
2r
u ]
) 2r−1
2r ,
Et[|Yu|2r−2] ≤
(
Et[Y
2r
u ]
) 2r−2
2r .
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Hence,
Et[Y
2r
s ] ≤ Et[Y 2rs1 ] + M˜
{∫ s
s1
Et[Y
2r
u ]du
+
∫ s
s1
(Et[Y
2r
u ])
2r−1
2r 1{u∈[t,t+ε)}du+
∫ s
s1
(Et[Y
2r
u ])
2r−2
2r 1{u∈[t,t+ε)}du
}
.
Since the process Et[Y
2r
s ] has continuous trajectories, supu∈[s1,s)Et[Y
2r
u ] is well-
defined and
Et[Y
2r
s ] ≤ Et[Y 2rs1 ] + M˜
{
sup
u∈[s1,s)
Et[Y
2r
u ] · (s− s1)
+ ( sup
u∈[s1,s)
Et[Y
2r
u ])
2r−1
2r
∫ s
s1
1{u∈[t,t+ε)}du
+ ( sup
u∈[s1,s)
Et[Y
2r
u ])
2r−2
2r
∫ s
s1
1{u∈[t,t+ε)}du
}
.
We will now use a trick from the proof in Zhou & Li (2000)[Lemma 4.2, Chapter
3] to ensure that after application of Young’s inequality we (supu∈[s1,s)Et[Y
2r
u ])
has a coefficient strictly smaller than 1:
Et[Y
2r
s ] ≤ Et[Y 2rs1 ] + M˜
{
sup
u∈[s1,s)
Et[Y
2r
u ] · (s− s1)
+ ( sup
u∈[s1,s)
Et[Y
2r
u ])
2r−1
2r · (δ
2
)
2r−1
2r · (2
δ
)
2r−1
2r
∫ s
s1
1{u∈[t,t+ε)}du
+ ( sup
u∈[s1,s)
Et[Y
2r
u ])
2r−2
2r · (δ
2
)
2r−2
2r · (2
δ
)
2r−2
2r
∫ s
s1
1{u∈[t,t+ε)}du
}
Applying Young’s inequality to the third term with p = 2r
2r−1 and q = 2r, and to
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the last term with p = 2r
2r−2 and q = r, then a.s.
Et[Y
2r
s ] ≤ Et[Y 2rs1 ] + M˜
{
sup
u∈[s1,s)
Et[Y
2r
u ] · (s− s1) +
2r − 1
2r
· δ
2
· sup
u∈[s1,s)
Et[Y
2r
u ]
+
1
2r
· (2
δ
)2r−1 · (
∫ s
s1
1{u∈[t,t+ε)}du)2r +
2r − 2
2r
· δ
2
· sup
u∈[s1,s)
Et[Y
2r
u ]
+
1
r
· (2
δ
)r−1 · (
∫ s
s1
1{u∈[t,t+ε)}du)r
}
Since s− s1 < δ, 2r−12r < 1 and 2r−22r < 1, then
Et[Y
2r
s ] ≤ Et[Y 2rs1 ] + M˜ · 2δ sup
u∈[s1,s)
Et[Y
2r
u ] +
M˜
2r
· (2
δ
)2r−1 · ε2r + M˜
k
· (2
δ
)r−1 · εr
Fixing δ = 1/(4M˜), taking the supremum for s ∈ [s1, s1 + δ), for any ε < 1, we
have the following estimate
sup
s∈[s1,s1+δ)
Et[Y
2r
r ] ≤ 2Et[Y 2rs1 ] + C1 · ε2r + C2 · εr
≤ 2Et[Y 2rs1 ] + C · εr,
for constants C1 = C1(r, L) and C2 = C2(r, L) depending only on r and L, and
C = C1 + C2. This estimate holds on intervals [t, t + δ), [t + δ, t + 2δ), . . . , [t +
nδ, t+ ε) for n := [ ε
δ
]. Recalling that Yt = 0, we have
sup
s∈[t,T ]
Et[Y
2r
s ] ≤
n∑
i=0
(2i+1 − 1) · C(r, L) · εr.
which proves the estimate for the process Y with the constant M1 =
C(r, L)
∑[1/δ]
i=0 (2
i+1 − 1) for ε < 1.
For the process (Zs), since the perturbation Dsvs1{s∈[t,t+ε)} exists only in the drift
term, when we apply the Itoˆ’s formula for Z2rs , the term Z
2r−2
s does not appear.
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Following similar lines of reasoning as above, we obtain
sup
s∈[s1,s1+δ)
Et[Z
2r
s ] ≤ 2Et[Z2rs1 ] + C˜ · ε2r.
where C˜ = C˜(r, L). Therefore, for ε < 1,
sup
s∈[t,T ]
Et[Z
2r
s ] ≤M2(r, L)ε2r,
with M2 = C˜(r, L)
∑[1/δ]
i=0 (2
i+1 − 1). Then M = max{M1(r, L),M2(r, L)} is the
constant in the statement of the theorem.
Denote ξt,ε,vs = Y
t,ε,v
s + Z
t,ε,v
s . Hence, the dynamics of ξ
t,ε,v
s follow

dξs = [Asξs +Bsvs1{s∈[t,t+ε)}]ds+ [Csξs +Dsvs1{s∈[t,t+ε)}]dWs, s ∈ [t, T ],
ξt = 0.
(5.9)
Lemma 5.3.4. The following estimate holds uniformly in s ∈ [t, T ]
Et[ξ
t,ε,v
s ] = O(ε). (5.10)
Proof. Since the diffusion term of (Ys) is square integrable, it disappears under
conditional expectation Et[Ys]. Recalling that (As) is deterministic, we have
Et[AsYs] = AsEt[Ys] so we can write an ODE for θs = Et[Ys]:

dθs = Asθsds, s ∈ [t, T ]
θt = 0.
Therefore, θs = 0 and Et[ξs] = Et[Zs] for s ∈ [t, T ]. By Jensen’s inequality and
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Lemma 5.3.3, we obtain
(Et[Zs])
2 ≤ Et[Z2s ] = O(ε2), ∀s ∈ [t, T ]. (5.11)
Remark 5.3.2. The proof of Lemma 5.3.4 reveals why (As) is assumed to be
deterministic as this allows us to disregard (Ys) in the estimate of conditional
expectation of (ξs). Random (As) requires the use Lemma 5.3.4 whose statement
cannot be strengthened for Et[Y
2
s ] (this is easy to see) resulting in an estimate
O(ε). Using Lemma 5.3.4 in its present form would weaken the estimate of Et[ξs]
to O(ε1/2) which is too little for the proof of Proposition 5.3.1.
Alternative proof of Lemma 5.3.4. The lemma can be proved directly. By taking
conditional expectation of both sides of (5.9) and using the fact that then the
stochastic integral disappears, we obtain
Et[ξs] =
∫ s
t
(
AsEt[ξs] +Et[Dsvs]1{s∈[t,t+ε)}
)
ds.
Denoting by ξˆ = Et[ξs] and bs = Et[Dsvs], the above is rewritten as an ordinary
differential equation
dξˆs =
(
Asξˆs + bs1{s∈[t,t+ε)}
)
ds
with a solution
ξˆs =
∫ (t+ε)∧s
t
bue
∫ u
t Ardrdu.
Consider a differential equation dθs =
(|As|θs + |bs|1{s∈[t,t+ε)})ds with solution
θs =
∫ (t+ε)∧s
t
|bu|e
∫ u
t |Ar|drdu.
Clearly, ξˆs ≤ θs. Moreover, if L = max{ess sup |vs|, ess sup |Ds|, sup |As|}, then
θs ≤
∫ (t+ε)∧s
t
L2e
∫ u
t Ldrdu ≤
∫ (t+ε)∧s
t
L2eL(u−t)du ≤ L2eL(T−t)ε,
which completes the proof.
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Lemma 5.3.5. The following equalities hold
Et[PT ξ
2
T ] = Et
[∫ T
t
{PsD2sv2s1{s∈[t,t+ε)} − ξ2sQs}ds
]
+Et
[∫ T
t
2ξs(PsBs + PsCsDs +KsDs)vs1{s∈[t,t+ε)}ds
]
a.s.
(5.12)
and
Et[p(T ; t)ξT ] = Et
∫ T
t
{−ξsQsX∗s + (p(s; t)Bs + k(s; t)Ds)vs1{s∈[t,t+ε)}} ds a.s..
(5.13)
Proof. Apply the Itoˆ’s formula to the process Psξ
2
s , where Ps is the solution of
BSDE (5.6):
d(Psξ
2
s ) = ξ
2
sdPs + Psdξ
2
s + dPsdξ
2
s
=
[
2PsBsvsξs1{s∈[t,t+ε)} + PsD2sv
2
s1{s∈[t,t+ε)}
+ 2ξsPsCsDsvs1{s∈[t,t+ε)} − ξ2sQs + 2ξsKsDsvs1{s∈[t,t+ε)}
]
ds
+
[
ξ2sKs + 2Psξ
2
sCs + 2PsξsDsvs1{s∈[t,t+ε)}
]
dWs. (5.14)
We will use the localisation method to prove (5.12). Let
τn := inf{s ≥ t;
∫ s
t
(ξ4sK
2
s + ξ
4
sP
2
s )ds > n}.
Random variables τn are (finite-valued) stopping times. Indeed,
∫ s
t
(ξ4uK
2
u + ξ
4
uP
2
u )du ≤
(
sup
u∈[t,T ]
ξ4u
) ∫ s
t
K2udu+
(
sup
u∈[t,T ]
ξ4u
) · ( sup
u∈[t,T ]
P 2u
)
.
Since all coefficients in (5.9) are essentially bounded, (Krylov, 2008, Corollary 6,
Section 2.5) implies that every moment of ξ is bounded. Also, by Lemma 5.3.1,
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we have (P (·), K(·)) ∈ L2F(Ω;C(t, T ;R))× L2F(t, T ;R). Then
∫ s
t
(ξ4sK
2
s + ξ
4
sP
2
s )ds <∞ a.s.
and
lim
n→∞
τn =∞.
In view of (5.14), we have
Et[PT∧τnξ
2
T∧τn ] = Et
[∫ T∧τn
t
{PsD2sv2s1{s∈[t,t+ε)} − ξ2sQs}ds
]
+Et
[∫ T∧τn
t
2ξs(PsBs + PsCsDs +KsDs)vs1{s∈[t,t+ε)}ds
]
.
(5.15)
For each n we have a.s.
∣∣PT∧τnξ2T∧τn∣∣ ≤ sup
s∈[t,T ]
|Ps| · sup
s∈[t,T ]
∣∣ξ2s ∣∣ ,
By Cauchy-Schwartz inequality
E
[
sup
s∈[t,T ]
|Ps| · sup
s∈[t,T ]
∣∣ξ2s ∣∣
]
≤
(
E[ sup
s∈[t,T ]
|PT |2]
) 1
2
(
E[ sup
s∈[t,T ]
|ξT |4]
) 1
2
<∞,
hence, conditional dominated convergence theorem (Williams, 1991, Lemma 9.7)
implies
lim
τn→∞
Et
[
PT∧τnξ
2
T∧τn
]
= Et
[
PT ξ
2
T
]
.
Similarly, quantities under conditional expectation on the right-hand side of
(5.15) are dominated by
∣∣∣∣∫ T∧τn
t
(
PsD
2
sv
2
s1{s∈[t,t+ε)} − ξ2sQs
)
ds
∣∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣∣∫ T∧τn
t
2ξs(PsBs + PsCsDs +KsDs)vs1{s∈[t,t+ε)}ds
∣∣∣∣
≤
∫ T
t
(∣∣PsD2sv2s1{s∈[t,t+ε)}∣∣+ ∣∣ξ2sQs∣∣) ds+ ∫ T
t
∣∣2ξs(PsBs + PsCsDs +KsDs)vs1{s∈[t,t+ε)}∣∣ ds.
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The expectation of the above bound is finite since it is dominated by
C
(
E
∫ t+ε
t
|Ps| ds+Et
∫ T
t
|ξs|2 ds
)
+ C
(
E
∫ t+ε
t
|ξsPs| ds+E
∫ t+ε
t
|ξsKs| ds
)
≤ C
(
E
∫ t+ε
t
|Ps| ds+E
∫ T
t
|ξs|2 ds
)
+ Cε1/2
(
sup
s∈[t,T ]
E |ξs|2
) 1
2
[( ∫ t+ε
t
E |Ps|2 ds
) 1
2
+
(∫ t+ε
t
E |Ks|2 ds
) 1
2
]
<∞.
Therefore, we can again apply conditional dominated convergence theorem to
infer (5.12) from (5.15). The proof of (5.13) is similar.
Corollary 5.3.3. The following estimate holds
Et
[∫ T
t
2ξs(PsBs + PsCsDs +KsDs)vs1{s∈[t,t+ε)}ds
]
= o(ε) a.s. (5.16)
Proof. Using conditional form of the estimates from the above proof we get
Et
[∫ T
t
2ξs(PsBs + PsCsDs +KsDs)vs1{s∈[t,t+ε)}ds
]
≤ Cε1/2
(
sup
s∈[t,T ]
Et |ξs|2
) 1
2
[( ∫ t+ε
t
Et |Ps|2 ds
) 1
2
+
(∫ t+ε
t
Et |Ks|2 ds
) 1
2
]
.
By Lemma 5.3.3, sups∈[t,T ]Et |ξs|2 = O(ε). It, therefore, suffices to prove that
(∫ t+ε
t
Et |Ps|2 ds
) 1
2
+
(∫ t+ε
t
Et |Ks|2 ds
) 1
2
= o(1),
which is clear given that both processes are square integrable.
We have now collected all preliminary results required in the proof of Proposition
5.3.1.
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Proof of Proposition 5.3.1. From the definition of the functional, we have
2(J(t,X∗t ;u
t,ε,v)− J(t,X∗t ;u∗))
= Et
∫ T
t
[Qs(X
t,ε,v
s )
2 +Rs(u
t,ε,v)2]ds+GEt[(X
t,ε,v
T )
2]
− h(Et[X t,ε,vT ])2 − 2(µ1X∗t + µ2)Et[X t,ε,vT ]
−Et
∫ T
t
[Qs(X
∗
s )
2 +Rs(u
∗)2]ds−GEt[(X∗T )2] + h(Et[X∗T ])2 + 2(µ1X∗t + µ2)Et[X∗T ]
= Et
∫ T
t
{
Qs[(X
t,ε,v
s )
2 − (X∗s )2] +Rs[(ut,ε,v)2 − (u∗)2]
}
ds
+GEt[(X
t,ε,v
T )
2 − (X∗T )2]− h[(Et[X t,ε,vT ])2 − (Et[X∗T ])2]
− 2(µ1X∗t + µ2)Et[X t,ε,vT −X∗T ].
Recalling that X t,ε,vs = X
∗
s + ξs and (a + b)
2 − b2 = a(a + 2b), we rewrite the
functional
2(J(t,X∗t ;u
t,ε,v)− J(t,X∗t ;u∗))
= Et
∫ T
t
Qs[2X
∗
s + ξs]ξsds+Et
∫ t+ε
t
Rs(2u
∗
s + vs)vsds
+GEt[ξ
2
T ] + 2GEt[ξTX
∗
T ]− h(Et[ξT ])2 − 2hEt[ξT ]Et[X∗T ]− 2(µ1X∗t + µ2)Et[ξT ]
= Et
∫ T
t
Qs[2X
∗
s + ξs]ξsds+Et
∫ t+ε
t
Rs(2u
∗
s + vs)vsds
+GEt[ξ
2
T ] + 2Et[(GX
∗
T − hEt[X∗T ]− µ1X∗t − µ2)ξT ]− h(Et[ξT ])2.
In view of (5.10), we have h(Et[ξT ])
2 = o(ε). By (5.12) and (5.16)
GEt[ξ
2
T ] = Et
∫ T
t
[PsD
2
sv
2
s1{s∈[t,t+ε)} − ξ2sQs]ds+ o(ε).
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In the final step of the proof we collect above results and also apply (5.13):
2(J(t,X∗t ;u
t,ε,v)− J(t,X∗t ;u∗))
= 2Et
∫ T
t
QsX
∗
s ξsds+Et
∫ t+ε
t
Rs(2u
∗
s + vs)vsds+Et
∫ T
t
[PsD
2
sv
2
s1{s∈[t,t+ε)}]ds
+ 2Et
∫ T
t
[−ξsQsX∗s + (p(s; t)Bs + k(s; t)Ds)vs1{s∈[t,t+ε)}] ds+ o(ε)
= Et
∫ t+ε
t
{
2[Rsu
∗
s + p(s; t)Bs +Dsk(s; t)]vs + [PsD
2
s +Rs]v
2
s
}
ds+ o(ε)
= Et
∫ t+ε
t
{
2Λ(s; t)vs +Hsv
2
s
}
ds+ o(ε),
where Λ(s; t) and Hs are defined in the statement of the proposition.
Lemma 5.3.6. An admissible control u∗ is an equilibrium control if and only if
lim inf
ε↓0
1
ε
Et
∫ t+ε
t
[Λ(s; t)vs]ds ≥ 0 a.s. (5.17)
for any t ∈ [0, T ) and v ∈ L∞F (t, T ;R).
Proof. If u∗ is an equilibrium control, by Proposition 5.3.1, for any A ∈ Ft,
v ∈ L∞F (t, T ;R) and t ∈ [0, T )
lim inf
ε↓0
1
ε
∫ t+ε
t
E
{(
Λ(s; t)vs +
1
2
Hsv
2
s
)
1A
}
ds ≥ 0. (5.18)
Fix t and v. For any N > 0, apply (5.18) to perturbation 1
N
v:
lim inf
ε↓0
1
ε
∫ t+ε
t
E
{( 1
N
Λ(s; t)vs +
1
2N2
Hsv
2
s
)
1A
}
ds ≥ 0.
Multiplying both sides by N and taking the limit as N →∞ yields
lim
N→∞
lim inf
ε↓0
1
ε
∫ t+ε
t
E
{(
Λ(s; t)vs +
1
2N
Hsv
2
s
)
1A
}
ds ≥ 0.
Recall that Hs = Rs + D
2
sPs ≥ 0 a.s. We can obtain an upper bound for
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1
ε
∫ t+ε
t
E[ 1
N
Hsv
2
s1A]ds which does not depend on ε. Indeed,
1
ε
∫ t+ε
t
E
{
1
N
Hsv
2
s1A
}
ds ≤ C 1
ε
1
N
E
{∫ t+ε
t
Hs1Ads
}
≤ C 1
ε
1
N
E
{
ε sup
s∈[t,t+ε)
|Hs|1A
}
≤ C
N
,
where, as before, the constant C may differ from line to line. Then,
0 ≤ lim
N→∞
lim inf
ε↓0
1
ε
∫ t+ε
t
E
{(
Λ(s; t)vs +
1
2N
Hsv
2
s
)
1A
}
ds
≤ lim
N→∞
lim inf
ε↓0
(
1
ε
∫ t+ε
t
E {Λ(s; t)vs1A} ds+ C
N
)
= lim inf
ε↓0
1
ε
∫ t+ε
t
E {Λ(s; t)vs1A} ds.
Conversely, assume (5.17) holds, since Hs ≥ 0 almost surely for s ∈ [t, T ], then
lim inf
ε↓0
1
ε
∫ t+ε
t
E
{
1
2
Hsv
2
s
}
ds ≥ 0 a.s.
which gives
lim inf
ε↓0
1
ε
∫ t+ε
t
E
{
(Λ(s; t)vs +
1
2
Hsv
2
s)
}
ds ≥ 0 a.s.
Theorem 5.3.4. u∗ is an equilibrium control if and only if
lim
ε↓0
1
ε
Et
∫ t+ε
t
[|Λ(s; t)|] ds = 0, a.s. (5.19)
for any t ∈ [0, T ) and v ∈ L∞F (t, T ;R).
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Proof. By Lemma 5.3.6, it suffices to show that
lim inf
ε↓0
1
ε
Et
∫ t+ε
t
[Λ(s; t)vs] ds ≥ 0 ⇔ lim
ε↓0
1
ε
Et
∫ t+ε
t
[|Λ(s; t)|] ds = 0.
If lim infε↓0 1εEt
∫ t+ε
t
[Λ(s; t)vs]ds ≥ 0 holds almost surely, then setting vs =
− sgn (Λ(s; t)), we have
− lim sup
ε↓0
1
ε
Et
∫ t+ε
t
[Λ(s; t) · sgn (Λ(s; t))]ds ≥ 0 a.s.
Hence,
lim sup
ε↓0
1
ε
Et
∫ t+ε
t
[|Λ(s; t)|] ds ≤ 0,
this yields
0 ≥ lim sup
ε↓0
1
ε
Et
∫ t+ε
t
[|Λ(s; t)|] ds ≥ lim inf
ε↓0
1
ε
Et
∫ t+ε
t
[|Λ(s; t)|] ds ≥ 0.
Therefore,
lim
ε↓0
1
ε
Et
∫ t+ε
t
[|Λ(s; t)|]ds = 0.
Conversely, if limε↓0 1εEt
∫ t+ε
t
[|Λ(s; t)|]ds = 0 holds almost surely, this implies
lim supε↓0
1
ε
Et
∫ t+ε
t
[|Λ(s; t)|] ds = 0. Then, for any v ∈ L∞F (t, T ;R), we have
lim inf
ε↓0
1
ε
Et
∫ t+ε
t
[Λ(s; t)vs]ds ≥ − lim sup
ε↓0
1
ε
∫ t+ε
t
Et[|Λ(s; t)| |vs|]ds
≥ −C · lim sup
ε↓0
1
ε
∫ t+ε
t
Et[|Λ(s; t)|]ds
= 0 a.s.
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5.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we study the open-loop equilibrium control for the linear-
quadratic problem in continuous time. In contrast to the existing literature (see
Hu et al. (2012)), where the equilibrium control is characterised via sufficient
condition, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition for open-loop equilib-
rium control. The motivation is that the investor may have her own preference
for the investment policy, and then our condition can be used to test her policy.
Existing literature (see Djehiche & Huang (2016)), study necessary and sufficient
condition for mean field type of equilibrium control under different assumption.
The assumptions require the boundedness of the state dynamic. However, within
the linear-quadratic framework, this condition is not satisfied.
Moreover, the equilibrium condition of a adapted process perturbation is iden-
tical to the condition of a random variable perturbation. Therefore, the type of
equilibrium strategy does not depend on the perturbation type. In conclusion,
the equilibrium approach can be viewed as a game for the investor. The equi-
librium investor has to choose two investment plans: short-term investment and
long-term investment plans. Although the investors might have a very good long-
term investment plan with a good rewards, they still have to decides the short-
term investment plan. As a result, the final investment strategies are modified
and adjusted to the corresponding short-term plan. The game for the investor
becomes choosing the best combination of the investment strategy.
Our results of equilibrium rationale indicate that there exists a family of equi-
librium strategies by choosing different short-term investment plans. Therefore,
the drawbacks we discussed in previous chapter are only responsible for the spe-
cific short-term plan. Regarding to improve the performance of the equilibrium
strategy, it is crucial to decide a sensible and profitable short-term plan.
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Chapter 6
Mean-Variance puzzle
6.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we are trying to address the feature of equilibrium control in
discrete time setting (present both in open-loop and closed-loop formulations)
that the investment in the risky asset increases as time approaches the investment
horizon. This is what we call the mean-variance puzzle. The equilibrium concept
has been understood through the game theoretic framework under finite time
horizon. The basic idea is that the investor chooses a decision at any time t by
agreeing to implement the policy she thinks that would also be optimal for future
times. She then views the problem as a cooperative game only with her future
self. Therefore, the investor will be able to find an equilibrium policy as long as
the future time is finite. Provided there is a long enough investment horizon, the
mean-variance puzzle manifests itself as the control goes to zero at the starting
point. To ensure there is a long-enough investment horizon, we allow the starting
point to move backwards in time.
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6.2 Solving the mean-variance puzzle with
Present-Biased preference
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that there is only one risky asset and one
risk-free asset available in the market. The risky asset has the excess return factor
Bt, which mean µt and variance σ
2
t for all t = 0, . . . , T − 1. In Chapter 3 and
Chapter 4, we have shown that the open and closed-loop equilibrium strategies
admit the following form:
uopt = Otxt,
and
uclt = Ctxt.
We can further simplify the closed-form solutions of open-loop (3.11) and closed-
loop (4.7) equilibrium strategies, the following representations can be obtained:
uopt = Otxt =
µt
γ ·Et
[∏T−1
i=t+1(Ai +Bi+1Oi)
]
σ2t
xt, (6.1)
and
uclt = Ctxt =
Et
[∏T−1
i=t+1(Ai +Bi+1Ci)
]
µt
γ ·Et
[∏T−1
i=t+1(Ai +Bi+1Ci)
2]σ2t
xt. (6.2)
We notice that, for Bt independently and identically distributed, the expression
in the denominator of open-loop control (6.1) can be written as:
Et
[ T−1∏
i=t+1
(Ai +Bi+1Oi)
]
=
T−1∏
i=t+1
Et[Ai +Bi+1Oi]
=
T−1∏
i=t+1
{
Ai +Et[Bi+1]Et[Oi]
}
.
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The expression inside of the curly bracket is always positive for any i ∈ {t +
1, . . . , T − 1} and Et[Bi+1] > 0 (which is a reasonable assumption). Therefore,
as t moves backwards, the control (6.1) will decay towards 0. Figure 6.1 shows
plots of both controls (6.1) and (6.2) where the mean-variance puzzle is evident.
This is in agreement with the numeric results in (Bjo¨rk et al., 2014) and (Hu
et al., 2012), where both open-loop and closed-loop equilibrium strategies would
decrease rapidly as time goes backwards.
Figure 6.1: The comparison between open-loop and closed-loop equilibrium
strategies as time moves away from terminal
Assuming that Bt is independent and identically distributed, then the result im-
plies that the investor would invest much less at the beginning than towards
maturity even if she faces exactly the same investment environment. This is
because the variance term penalizes perturbation quadratically as well as the
expectation term only increases linearly. If the investor deviates slightly from
the equilibrium, as long as it’s far away from the maturity, the variance would
eventually penalise the perturbation more than any benefits added by the expec-
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tation term. As a consequence, the control should be sufficiently small in order
to keep the variance low enough. In our view, this is unreasonable in practice
and this feature is unrealistic. In the remaining of this section, we concentrate
on addressing this unrealistic feature (the mean-variance puzzle).
Recall the independent and identical increment case, the open-loop control (3.12)
can be written as
ut =
µ
γ αt+1 σ2
xt,
where
αt = αt+1 · At + µ
2
γσ2
with αT = 1.
Such a strategy is in the form of one-period mean-variance strategy with the risk-
aversion coefficient γαt+1. Therefore, we can modify the risk-aversion depending
on time, forcing the strategy to be riskier if the investor is far away from the
maturity. We will call this type of risk aversion Present-Biased preference. The
name follows from a long history on studying the Strotz-Pollak equilibrium prob-
lem (see for example (Phelps & Pollak, 1968) and (Peleg & Yaari, 1973)) with
Present-Biased preference. The fundamental framework in (Phelps & Pollak,
1968) postulates that the preference for the investor at time t is represented by
the sum of the utilities of future payoffs. Since the utilities are applied identically
for the time t and future, then the future payoff at time t+k should be discounted
by a factor δβk. The constant factor δ represents the degree of selfishness and β is
the discounting factor. In what follows, we consider a Present-Biased preference
in the same spirit to avoid th control decay to zero.
6.2.1 Case 1: At = 1 for all t (zero interest rate)
In this section, we will use the arithmetic excess return and set the interest rate
equal to zero. Suppose the investor is sitting at time t = T−k, which is k periods
away from the maturity. Then we have
ut := uT−k =
µ
γT−k αT−k+1 σ2
·XT−k, (6.3)
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where
αT−k+1 = αT−k+2 · 1 + µ
2
γT−k+1 σ2
= αT−k+3 +
µ2
σ2
(
1
γT−k+1
+
1
γT−k+2
)
= αT +
µ2
σ2
k−1∑
i=1
1
γT−i
= 1 +
µ2
σ2
k−1∑
i=1
1
γT−i
.
Therefore, the denominator of control (6.3), we get
γT−k · αT−k+1 = γT−k + µ
2
σ2
k−1∑
i=1
γT−k
γT−i
. (6.4)
Suppose we choose the risk-aversion in the following form:
γT−k = γe−q(k−1),
for some positive constant q and γ. Under such risk attitude, if the investor is far
away from the maturity (large k), then variance is less penalised and she invests
more in the stocks. Therefore, the summation in Equation (6.4) can be written
as:
k−1∑
i=1
γT−k
γT−i
= e−qk
k−1∑
i=1
eqi.
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We are interested in the asymptotic behavior as time goes backwards, which
means as k tends to infinity. We have
γT−k · αT−k+1 = lim
k→∞
{ 1
kq
+
µ2e−qk
σ2
k−1∑
i=1
eqi
}
= lim
k→∞
{ 1
kq
+
µ2e−qk
σ2
· e
q − eqk
1− eq
}
= lim
k→∞
{ 1
kq
+
µ2
σ2
· e
−q(k−1) − 1
1− eq
}
=
µ2
σ2
· 1
eq − 1 .
In practice, the exponential risk-aversion eliminates the variance and the investor
would immediately try to maximise the expectation. Therefore, we would like
the exponential risk-aversion to decay as slow as possible. We suggest to consider
the risk-aversion in the form:
γT−k = γe−
(k−1)
T
In the case when k is small, such time-dependent risk-aversion coefficient constant
risk-aversion. In the case when k is large, the investor becomes more risky.
Consequently, as k tends to infinity, the equilibrium control tends to
uT−k → µ
σ2
· σ
2(e
1
T − 1)
µ2
·XT−k = e
1
T − 1
µ
·XT−k
In the case γT−k = γe−
(k−1)
T , the original functional can be reformulated as
J(t, xt, st; u¯t) = Et[e
− (k−1)
T XT ]− γ
2xt
Vart(e
− (k−1)
T XT )
This is a Present-Biased preference mean-variance problem with the discounting
fator β = e−
1
T .
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Example: Black-Scholes model with present-biased risk aversion
Recall the mean-variance problem with present-biased preference and i.i.d Bt:
J(t, xt; u¯t) = Et
[
XT
]− 3e−(T−t−1)
2xt
Vart
(
XT
)
.
The figure below shows the open-loop strategies (the proportion of wealth in-
vested in stock) for 30-years investment.
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Figure 6.2: The comparison between constant risk-aversion and present-biased
risk-aversion. The red dash line indicates the strategy using present-biased risk
averision, whereas the blue dash line indicates the constant risk aversion
We see that, with Present-Biased risk aversion, the strategy does not go to zero
90
6.2 Solving the mean-variance puzzle with Present-Biased preference
as time goes backwards. However, it is still observed that the strategy becomes
riskier towards the terminal time.
6.2.2 Case 2: At > 1 for all t. (positive interest rate)
Suppose the investor is sitting at time t = T − k, which is k periods away from
the maturity. Then from the previous result, we have
ut := uT−k =
µ
γT−k αT−k+1 σ2
·XT−k,
where
αT−k+1 = αT−k+2 · AT−k+1 + µ
2
γT−k+1 σ2
= αT−k+2 · AT−k+2 · AT−k+1 + µ
2
σ2
( 1
γT−k+1
+
AT−k+1
γT−k+2
)
= αT ·
k−1∏
i=1
AT−i +
µ2
σ2
k−1∑
i=1
∏k−1−i
j=1 AT−k+j
γT−i
=
k−1∏
i=1
AT−i +
µ2
σ2
k−1∑
i=1
∏k−1−i
j=1 AT−k+j
γT−i
Recall that Ai = e
r for all i, then
αT−k+1 = er·(k−1) +
µ2
σ2
k−1∑
i=1
er·(k−1−i)
γT−i
Suppose we choose the risk-aversion in the following form:
γT−k = γe−r·q·k,
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for some positive constant q > 1 and γ. Therefore,
γT−k · αT−k+1 = γe−r·q·ker·(k−1) + γe−r·q·k · µ
2
σ2
·
k−1∑
i=1
er·(k−1−i)
γe−r·q·i
= γe(1−q)rk−r +
µ2
σ2
·
k−1∑
i=1
erk−r−ri−rqk+rqi
= γe(1−q)rk−r +
µ2
σ2
· er(k−1−qk)
k−1∑
i=1
e(q−1)ri
= γe(1−q)rk−r +
µ2
σ2
· er(k−1−qk) · e
(q−1)r − e(q−1)rk
1− e(q−1)r
= γe(1−q)rk−r +
µ2
σ2
· e
(1−q)rk+r(q−2) − e−r
1− e(q−1)r
Since q > 1, then as time goes backwards, we have
lim
k→∞
γT−k · αT−k+1 = µ
2
σ2
· e
−r
e(q−1)r − 1 .
Hence, as k tends to infinity, the equilibrium control tends to
uT−k → e
r(eq − 1)
µ
·XT−k.
Since our risk-aversion decays exponentially fast, as k tends to infinity, the
penalty from the risk is negligible. Therefore, the asymptotic open-loop equi-
librium control does not depend on the volatility of the stocks. On the other
hand, when we use the parameter q > 1, the discount rate is larger than the
interest rate. This suggests an alternative way to look at the model in the case
where interest rate is negative.
6.2.3 Case 3: At ∈ (0, 1) for all t. (negative interest rate)
There are two circumstances forAt being in such range: Firstly, when the inflation
rate is higher than the interest rate. The central bank tends to implement the
policy based on the Friedman’s k-percent rule. Milton Friedman, a Nobel-prize-
winning economist, proposed that the central bank should increase the money
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supply by a constant percentage rate every year, irrespective of business cycles. In
many developing countries, especially in China, the inflation rate is on average
around 3% to 4% per year and the interest rate for 1-year zero coupon bond
is 1.75%. If the investor deposits the money into the bank account, then the
purchasing power of the money would actually depreciate. However, the economy
in the developing countries is growing fast, which makes the real estate or stocks
more attractive than the zero-coupon bond. For example, an investor decides to
invest from 1999 to 2014 for 15 years. The average return rate for 1-year zero
coupon is 2% in China, in which the equivalent return rate is 35% for 15 years.
However, the Shanghai Composite Stock Market Index raised from 1123.70 to
3000, in which the return rate is 300%. Therefore, the investor should buy stocks
rather than make savings to keep the value of money.
This situation is not uncommon in modern market. In 2015, Switzerland has be-
come the first government to sell 10-year bonds with a yield of −0.055%. Sweden,
Denmark, European and Japanese Central Bank have followed and cut their key
interest rate below zero. This means investors buying risk-free assets and hold-
ing to maturity will not get the same money back. This situation encourages the
investor to invest in stock in order to keep the value of her assets, which makes
the investor more risk-seeking.
Hence, we consider the wealth model as following:
Xt+1 = AtXt +Bt+1ut
where
At = e
−c,
Bt+1 =
St+1
St
− e−c,
for some positive constant c. We can understand the model as following: in the
case where the interest rate is negative, then r = −c. In the case where the infla-
tion rate is higher than the interest rate, then (Interest rate−Inflation rate) = −c.
Such a model indicates that if the investor decides not to invest the money into
stock market, then the real value of money would actually depreciate. On the
other hand,
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Hence,
αT−k+1 = αT−k+2 · AT−k+1 + µ
2
γ σ2
= αT−k+2 · AT−k+2 · AT−k+1 + µ
2
σ2
(1
γ
+
AT−k+1
γ
)
= αT ·
k−1∏
i=1
AT−i +
µ2
γ σ2
k−1∑
i=1
k−1−i∏
j=1
AT−k+j
= e−(k−1)·c +
µ2
γ σ2
k−1∑
i=1
e−(k−1−i)·c.
Then,
γ · αT−k+1 = e−(k−1)·c · γ + µ
2
σ2
k−1∑
i=1
e−(k−1−i)·c.
We can see the last term is the geometric series. We can obtain
k−1∑
j=1
e−(k−1−i)·c = e(1−k)·c ·
k−1∑
j=1
ec·i
= e(1−k)·c · e
c − eck
1− ec
=
e(2−k)·c − ec
1− ec .
Hence, as t goes backward, and as k tends to infinity, we have
lim
k→∞
γ · αT−k+1 = e
c
ec − 1 ·
µ2
σ2
=
1
1− e−c ·
µ2
σ2
.
and the equilibrium control tends to
uT−k → µ
σ2
·XT−k · σ
2
µ2
· (1− e−c)
=
1− e−c
µ
·XT−k, as k tends to infinity.
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Notice that this control does not go to zero as k tends to infinity, even though
the Present-Biased preference is not used. That is because the effect of negative
interest rate counteracts the penalty for the variance.
Remark. One can always direct the problem into the case of negative interest
rate by considering an anticipated inflation rate that is higher than the risk-free
interest rate.
6.3 Conclusion
This chapter presents the idea of using state-dependent present-biased preference
as the risk-aversion parameter. Our analysis addresses the drawbacks of state-
dependent risk-aversion which is proposed by Bjo¨rk et al. (2014). The focus
is given to analyse the investment behaviour for equilibrium strategy from the
behavioural economic perspective. Our result points to the risk attitude of the
investor corresponding to the investment time point.
The present-biased risk aversion has been defined e−qk, where k is the number of
periods away from the maturity and q is degree of bias for the risk attitude as
time goes backward. With using a present-biased risk aversion parameter in i.i.d
case, we have shown that the open-loop equilibrium strategy tends to a constant
proportion invested in the stock with respect to differnt wealth.
95
Chapter 7
Numerical Simulation
Based on the equilibrium strategies presented in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, this
chapter assesses the performance of equilibrium strategies together with pre-
commitment strategies and explores numerically the impact of equlibrium in-
vestors’ behaviour. The closed-form solution of pre-commitment strategy in Li
& Ng (2000) will be introduced in next section. A variety of investment situa-
tions such as an identical and independent market return, a booming market and
a depression market will be discussed. We analyse the investment impact of in-
vestors’ present-biased preference in performance evaluation by varying the value
of biased level q. Finally, we compare the investment performance by allowing
investors to re-evaluate regularly.
7.1 Pre-commitment v.s. Equilibrium: I.I.D
model
In this section, we study the difference between the performance of the pre-
commitment and equilibrium strategies. Suppose there are two assets available
in the market: one risk-free asset with risk-free rate r and one risky asset with
independent and identical investment return: mean E[B] and variance Var(B).
We refer to the results for pre-commitment strategy from Li & Ng (2000)[Section
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3]. The optimal pre-commitment strategy up,∗ follows:
up,∗t = −
erE[B]
E[B2]
Xt +
1
2
(bX0 +
ν
2γa
)
(A1
A2
)T−t−1 E[B]
E[B2]
for t = 0, . . . , T − 1,
(7.1)
where
K =
(E[B])2
E[B2]
, A1 = er − e
r(E[B])2
E[B2]
, A2 = e2r − (e
rE[B])2
E[B2]
K1t = K
(A1)T−t−1
2(A2)T−t−1
, K2t = K(
(A1)T−t−1
2(A2)T−t−1
)2
µ = (A1)T , τ = (A2)T , ν =
T−1∑
t=0
(A1)T−t−1K1t
a =
ν
2
− ν2, b = µν
a
, c = τ − µ2 − ab2.
r 0.05 E[B] 0.1
Var(B) 0.09 X0 1
γ 0.5
Table 7.1: Parameters setting for the market with independent and identical
returns
Table 7.1 shows the values for different parameter. In this case, we have K =
0.158, A1 = 0.885, A2 = 0.930, µ = 0.295, ν = 0.486, a = 0.0367, b = 3.297, and
c = 0. The expected terminal wealth and variance under the pre-commitment
strategy up,∗ with respect to a given risk-aversion parameter γ follow:
E[XT ] = e
rTX0 +
1− (1−K)T
2γ(1−K)T (7.2)
Var(XT ) =
1− (1−K)T
4γ(1−K)T . (7.3)
The analytical expression of the mean-variance efficient frontier Li & Ng
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(2000)[Section 3, Equation (27)] is
Var(XT ) =
(1−K)T
1− (1−K)T (E[XT ]−X0e
rT ) for E[XT ] ≥ X0(er)T (7.4)
We set initial wealth X0 equal to 1 and simulate a number of different wealth tra-
jectories by using the open-loop equilibrium (Corollary 3.3.6), closed-loop equi-
librium (Corollary 4.3.3) and pre-commitment strategies (equation (7.1)).The
parameters for simulation are given in 7.1. Next, we record the terminal value
XT with respect to each simulation. For n simulations, we obtain a sequence of
terminal wealth (X1T , X
2
T , . . . , X
n
T ). Denote Et=0,X0 [·] = E[·|t = 0, X0 = 1] and
Vart=0,X0 [·] = Var[·|t = 0, X0 = 1]. We can calculate the mean Et=0,X0 [XT ] and
the standard deviation Stdt=0,X0 [XT ]. Then, we will evaluate the performance
by using the Sharpe ratio of simulated terminal wealth
Et=0,X0
[XT ]
Stdt=0[XT ]
. Furthermore,
we will compare the performance in following two situations:
1. The different investment periods: 10 years and 40 years.
2. Using the present-biased risk aversion.
Figure 7.1 shows the probability density function of terminal wealth for X0 =
1. For 10 years investment period, the pair (Stdu
p
t=0,x0
[XT ],E
up
t=0[XT ]) =
(1.401584, 3.511251), while the open-loop equilibrium strategy with con-
stant risk-aversion gives (Stdu
o
t=0,x0
[XT ],E
uo
t=0,x0
[XT ]) = (0.7824366, 2.4664584)
and the closed-loop equilibrium strategy with constant risk-aversion gives
(Stdu
c
t=0,x0
[XT ],E
uc
t=0[XT ]) = (0.5628208, 2.1860717). The Sharpe ratios for ter-
minal wealth for pre-commitment, open-loop and closed-loop strategies are 2.5,
3.15 and 3.88, respectively. Although the pre-commitment gives better expected
return E[XT ], the pre-commitment is more risky compared to the equilibrium
strategy due to the left tail of the density function.
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Figure 7.1: Probability density function for 10-year investment with 65,000 Monte
Carlo simulations. The parameters are given in Table 7.1 with a constant risk-
aversion parameter γ = 0.5.
The figures 7.2 shows the mean and standard deviation for the terminal wealth
for various length of investment period. It can be seen that both open-loop and
closed-loop equilibrium strategies have a low terminal return variance, whereas
pre-commitment starts to out-perform the equilibrium strategies for longer in-
vestment period. For example, in table 7.2, although the Sharpe ratio of equilib-
rium strategy is higher than the pre-commitment strategy, the pre-commitment
strategy achieves a high return with a reasonable level of variance. Compared
with pre-commitment, the equilibrium strategy is a state-independent strategy
in which the investors only invest a small amount of money during the whole
investment period. As a result, the small amount of investment leads to a low
standard deviation of terminal wealth.
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Figure 7.2: Mean and standard deviation for three different strategies. There are
65000 Monte Carlo simulations. The parameters are given in Table 7.1.
.
Figure 7.3: The closed-loop strategy with the parameters given in Table 7.1 for
investment periods between 1 and 50 years.
.
Figure 7.2 also provides a comparison for two types of equilibrium strategies.
First of all, we observe the standard deviation of the closed-loop equilibrium
strategies increase much faster after 31 years. This phenomenon is caused by
the negative initial investment of closed-loop equilibrium strategies. As shown
in Figure 7.3, the closed-loop equilibrium strategies approach to negative value
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40 yrs Standard deviation Mean
Pre-commitment 7.016938 74.04783
Open-loop 1.0879517 9.568016
Closed-loop 0.8855937 7.198412
Table 7.2: Means and standard deviations of terminal wealth for 40-years invest-
ment under different strategies
around year 31. Next, to compare the performance between two equilibrium
strategy, we analyse the ratio of Sharpe ratios, which is defined by:
ratio of sharpe ratios =
Expected returnopen/Expected returnclosed
Standard deviationopen/Standard deviationclosed
.
If the ratio is above 1, then it describes that the open-loop equilibrium strategy
achieves a higher return than closed-loop with respect to the same level of risk.
For example, in table 7.2, the open-loop equilibrium policy yields an expected
return of 9.568016
1.0879517
= 8.794522, while the closed-loop equilibrium policy only gives
10.467957
1.725999
= 8.128346. The ratio of Sharpe ratios is equal to 1.081957. Therefore,
we conclude that the open-loop equilibrium strategy is preferable to closed-loop
strategy for 40-years investment period.
Figure 7.4: The ratio of terminal wealth Sharpe ratios for equilibrium strategies.
Figure 7.4 shows the ratio defined as above for various investment periods. We can
see that, before 37-years investment time, the closed-loop equilibrium performs
better than the open-loop equilibrium. After 37-years investment time, the open-
loop equilibrium becomes better than the closed-loop equilibrium.
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Figure 7.5: The ratio of terminal wealth Sharpe ratios for equilibrium strategies
Figure 7.6: The ratio of terminal wealth’s Sharpe ratios for equilibrium strategies
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Figure 7.5 - Figure 7.6 show the mean path of 65, 000 Monte Carlo simulated
trajectories for both open-loop equilibrium and closed-loop equilibrium strate-
gies with state-dependent risk aversion 1
2xt
and state-independent risk aversion
1
2
, respectively. First, we notice that the state-dependent risk-aversion coeffi-
cient yields an increase in the mean of open-loop terminal wealth. In contrast,
the mean of closed-loop equilibrium is almost identical to the state-independent
case. This observation shows that the improvement of closed-loop equilibrium
investment may depend on the initial wealth level. Secondly, the open-loop equi-
librium wealth has a wide lower quantile and a narrow upper quantile in the
state-dependent case. In addition, the distance between mean and quantiles does
not change along with an increase in investment period, whereas the quantiles
shrink towards the mean in the state-independent case. Finally, as shown in
figure 7.6, the lower quantile of open-loop terminal wealth increases and crosses
the upper quantile of closed-loop terminal wealth as investment period increases,
which means three quarter of the open-loop terminal wealth is greater than three
quarter of closed-loop equilibrium terminal wealth. Therefore, the open-loop
equilibrium strategy is more likely to yield a higher terminal wealth than the
closed-loop equilibrium strategy.
Figure 7.7 shows the mean and standard deviation of open-loop terminal
wealth with present-biased risk-aversion coefficient for various investment pe-
riods. As described in Chapter 6.2, the present-biased risk-aversion has the form:
e−qr(T−t−1)
2xt
. The value of biased level q is tested between 0 and 10 with a step
size of 0.5. It can be noticed that the present-biased risk-aversion leads to a
deterioration in the performance of the wealth’s Sharpe ratio. As biased level
increases, the Sharpe ratios decreases. This is because an increase in biased level
causes the investors to invest in the stock aggressively from the beginning of the
investment period. The variance of terminal wealth grows quadratically corre-
sponding to this adjusted investment, while the mean of terminal wealth grows
linearly. Furthermore, we notice that the crossing point between red and blue
lines shifts towards left along with the increase in investment period. Therefore-
for long term investment, using the present-biased risk coefficient will result a
drop in the Sharpe ratio.
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(a) 5 years investment period (b) 10 years investment period
(c) 20 years investment period (d) 40 years investment period
Figure 7.7: Mean and standard deviation with present-biased risk-aversion pa-
rameter for different investment periods.
7.2 Pre-commitment v.s. Equilibrium: Case
study
In the previous section, we study the performance of different types of strategies
by using the Monte Carlo simulations. In this section, we carry out numerical
tests on comparing the strategies for Apple Inc stock shares. We will test our
comparison in the following ways:
• Case Study A Suppose the investor enters the market in Jan, 2000 with all
the information from 2000 to 2017, i.e., the stock price between 2000 and
2017 is known. Then we compare the pre-commitment strategy and equi-
librium strategy with monthly rebalancing for three different time lengths:
5 years, 10 years and 15 years.
• Case Study B Suppose the investor enter the market in Jan, 2000 with the
parameters estimated from past 5 years (1995 − 1999) and rebalances the
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strategies monthly. Then the investor aims to invest for 15 years and re-
evaluate his strategies for every 1, 3 and 5 years.
The primary goal in this chapter is to compare the different investment behaviours
and investment outcomes of equilibrium strategies. We classify the investment
situations into two cases: first, we suppose that the investors evaluate their strate-
gies at the beginning of the investment period and the investors do not intend to
change the strategies afterwards. Such situation is analysed in the Case Study A.
Since our study focuses on the comparison of the performance between different
strategies, without considering the estimated parameter sensitivity for different
strategies, we would like to assume the investors have all useful information about
future stock market. Therefore, the investors are assumed to observe all relevant
information of future share prices.
In contrast, Case Study B illustrates a different investment behaviour by allow-
ing regular re-evaluation of the strategies. Since the pre-commitment has been
well-studied and widely used under this circumstance, the Case study B explores
the performance of equilibrium strategies compared to the pre-commitment. Fur-
thermore, as the estimated parameters change along with re-evaluation time, we
can analyse the parameter sensitivity of equilibrium strategies. For the sake
of simplicity, we assume the independence for the future asset returns and the
investors enter the market with 1000 dollars.
7.2.1 Case Study A
Figure 7.8: Apple Inc. share price from Jan,1999 to Jan,2018
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The Figure 7.8 shows the stock price of Apple. We observe the uptrend and
downtrend in the price movement. The 5 years investment parameters are esti-
mated for 60 months from 2000 to 2005. The mean and standard deviation of
monthly excess return rate estimated for 5 years investment period are 0.01673431
and 0.1688279, respectively. The 95% confidence interval for estimated 5-years
excess return is (−0.007146538, 0.04061516). The 10 years investment parame-
ters are estimated for 120 months from 2000 to 2010. The mean and standard
deviation of monthly excess return rate estimated for 10 years investment pe-
riod are 0.02658799 and 0.1466011, respectively. The 95% confidence interval for
estimated 10-years excess return is (0.9787574, 1.019367). The 15 years invest-
ment parameters are estimated from 180 months from 2000 to 2015. The mean
and standard deviation of monthly excess return rate estimated for 15 years in-
vestment period are 0.02568134 and 0.126899, respectively. The 95% confidence
interval for estimated 15-years excess return is (0.007731372, 0.0436313).
Based on the parameter listed above, we will show the resulting strategies for
three different types of risk-aversion parameters: constant risk-aversion param-
eter (1
2
), state-dependent risk-aversion parameter ( 1
2xt
), and present-biased risk-
aversion parameter ( e
−qr(T−t−1)
2xt
). The aims of studying these risk-aversion pa-
rameters are different. In state-independent risk-aversion parameter case, we
focus on studying the difference in structure between open-loop and closed-loop
equilibrium strategies with different investment periods. In the state-dependent
risk-aversion parameter case, we focus on assessing different investment perfor-
mance between pre-commitment, open-loop equilibrium and closed-loop equilib-
rium strategies. In the present-biased risk-aversion parameter case, we focus
on improving the investment outcome for open-loop equilibrium strategy with
different biased level q.
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State-independent Risk-aversion Coefficient Case
Figure 7.9: The equilibrium strategies for 5 years investment period. The pa-
rameters are estimated from 2000 to 2005.
Figure 7.10: The equilibrium strategies for 15 years investment period. The
parameters are estimated from 2000 to 2010.
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Figure 7.11: The equilibrium strategies for 5 years investment period. The pa-
rameters are estimated from 2000 to 2015.
Figures 7.9 - 7.11 show the amount of money invested in stock for different equi-
librium strategies. First, we observe that the open-loop equilibrium strategies are
always above the closed-loop equilibrium strategies. This is because the short-
term plan of open-loop equilibrium strategies only invests in the stock market for
one period. Compared with the closed-loop equilibrium investor, the open-loop
equilibrium investors take less future risk into account in the short-term invest-
ment plan. Then the open-loop equilibrium strategies are more risky than the
closed-loop equilibrium strategies. Second, the open-loop and closed-loop equilib-
rium strategies approach to the same value at the end of investment period. This
value is the mean-variance strategy for single-period framework, which depends
on the estimated values of excess return and variance. Finally, as we mentioned
in Chapter 4, for long period (e.g. 15 years), the initial closed-loop equilibrium
strategy becomes negative.
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Figure 7.12: The logarithm of wealth paths under different investment strategies
for various investment periods.
Figure 7.12 shows the logarithm of wealth paths for different investment periods.
First of all, we notice that there is no differences in terminal wealth between
open-loop and closed-loop equilibrium strategies for 5 years, 10 years and 15
years. Also, the equilibrium wealth paths are identical to the risk-free wealth
path. This shows the equilibrium wealth is driven by the risk-free asset return
rather than the stock investment return.
State-dependent Risk-aversion Coefficient Case
It can be criticised that the investment amount is fixed for any amount of ini-
tial wealth. As we described above, the state-independent wealth path is driven
by the risk-free asset return. The state-dependent risk-aversion coefficient solves
such problem. Considering the state-dependent risk-aversion coefficient, the re-
sulting figures for equilibrium strategies are identical to the Figures 7.9 - 7.11.
However, instead of the amount of money invested in the stock market, the y-axis
indicates the proportion of the current wealth investing in the stocks.
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Figure 7.13: The logarithm of wealth paths by pre-commitment, open-loop and
closed-loop equilibrium strategies for 5 years investment period.
Figure 7.14: The logarithm of wealth paths by pre-commitment, open-loop and
closed-loop equilibrium strategies for 10 years investment period.
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Figure 7.15: The logarithm of wealth paths by pre-commitment, open-loop and
closed-loop equilibrium strategies for 15 years investment period.
Figures 7.13 - 7.15 show the logarithm of wealth paths for three types of strate-
gies: pre-commitment, open-loop equilibrium and closed-loop equilibrium strate-
gies. Fist of all, we notice that, in figure 7.15, the wealth under pre-commitment
strategies becomes negative at 11th month. This is because the pre-commiment
investors try to achieve the target investment and invest a dramatical amount of
money into the stock market (see Figure 7.16). For illustration, the investment
proportion for pre-commitment strategy has a range between −40 and 10. Once
the target is achieved, the pre-commitment investors will stabilise their wealth
around the target by reducing the amount of investment. Such behaviour can be
observed in Figure 7.16. In contrast, the equilibrium investors always start with
a small proportion and become risk-seeking at the maturity. Secondly, compared
with closed-loop equilibrium strategies, open-loop equilibrium strategies yield a
better terminal wealth in general. Although Figure 7.13 shows that the closed-
loop equilibrium strategy gives higher terminal wealth, the open-loop achieves a
better performance between month 12 and month 60. Finally, the equilibrium
strategies yield better terminal wealth than the pre-commitment strategies. This
is because the pre-commitment strategy optimises the objective function at the
initial time. The pre-commitment investors set their target investment based
on the initial wealth level, whereas there is no targeting threshold for equilib-
rium investors. As the wealth level changes dramatically over a long period, the
targeting wealth evaluating from pre-commitment is undervalued at initial time.
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Figure 7.16: The truncated investment proportions of pre-commitment, closed-
loop and open-loop equilibrium strategies.
Present-biased risk-aversion Coefficient Case
We study the present-biased risk-aversion coefficient with the range of biased level
q between 0.01 and 10. As a result of applying present-biased risk aversion, the
sizes of the open-loop equilibrium strategies (the absolute value of the investment
proportion) increase at the beginning of investment period. Figures 7.17 shows
the terminal wealth for three different investment periods. We notice the present-
biased risk-aversion parameter increases the terminal investment wealth for 10
and 15 years investment. In contrast, the terminal wealth strictly decreases
as the biased level increases for 5 years investment period. It is interesting to
explore whether such observation holds for general. Therefore, we use the share
prices of Sony Corporation to compare the result between state-dependent and
present-biased risk-aversion coefficients.
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Figure 7.17: The logarithm terminal wealth of present-biased risk-aversion coef-
ficients with different biased level q for Apple inc. stock. The investment periods
are 5, 10 and 15 years. The horizontal dash lines are the terminal threshold with
state-dependent risk-aversion coefficients.
Figure 7.18: Sony Corporation share price from Jan, 1999 to Jan, 2018.
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Figure 7.19: The logarithm terminal wealth of present-biased risk-aversion coef-
ficients with different biased level q for Sony corporation stock. The investment
periods are 5, 10 and 15 years. The horizontal dash lines are the terminal thresh-
old with state-dependent risk-aversion coefficients.
Figure 7.18 shows the share prices of Sony corporation between 1999 and 2018. It
can be noticed that, in the first two years, there is a recession in the stock market.
As a result, the estimated means of excess return are all negative and open-loop
strategies become all negative (short-selling). The higher biased level q yields a
larger investment in the risk-free asset. Since the price of Sony shares is stabilised
after first few years, it is not profitable to keep investing a large proportion of
wealth in the risk-free asset for long term. For illustration, in figure 7.19, the
red curve decays with a higher biased level. Compared with state-dependent
risk-aversion parameter, the present-biased risk-aversion parameters is able to
achieve an improvement in terminal wealth. However, it is crucial to determine
the biased level q based on the anticipated future.
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7.2.2 Case Study B
In previous subsection, we address the issue with ”Case Study A”: without ad-
justing the targeting threshold for pre-commitment strategies, the equilibrium
strategies out-perform the pre-commitment in the long-term investment. There-
fore, in ”Case Study B”, we would like to further explore the situation in which
the adjustment is allowed. While the adjustment is allowed, the input parameters
are estimated from past 5 years.
State-dependent Risk-aversion Coefficient Case
To illustrate the impact of frequent evaluation of the equilibrium strategies, Fig-
ure 7.20 -7.21 indicate that the re-evaluation does not help the equilibrium in-
vestors to improve the performance of the investment. The intuition is straight-
forward. Since the equilibrium strategies only becomes risky towards the matu-
rity, apart from those strategies near the maturity, the changes of remaining equi-
librium strategies are relatively small. Then the open-loop equilibrium strategies
with three different updating frequency are relatively close to each other. Also,
as long as the updating estimated parameters (mean of excess return, variance
of excess return and the interest rate) do not change significantly, the result-
ing terminal strategies are almost identical near the maturity. For example, as
shown in Figure 7.22, the terminal size of equilibrium strategy for the brown line
estimated from 2010 is almost identical the green dash line estimated from 2012.
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Figure 7.20: The logarithm of wealth paths by open-loop equilibrium strategies
for 15 years investment period. The equilibrium strategies have been re-evaluated
for every 1 year, 3 years and 5 years.
Figure 7.21: The logarithm of wealth paths by closed-loop equilibrium strategies
for 15 years investment period. The equilibrium strategies have been re-evaluated
for every 1 year, 3 years and 5 years.
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Figure 7.22: The open-loop equilibrium strategies for 15 years investment period
by re-evaluating in every 1 year, 3 years and 5 years.
The figures 7.23-7.24 further illustrate the wealth paths and size of pre-
commitment strategies with different re-evaluating frequency. Compare Fig-
ure 7.23 with 7.15, we notice that a high frequency of re-evaluation is able to
improve the performance of investment under the pre-commitment strategies.
This is because the targeting threshold is amended based on the current wealth
and estimated parameters. In Figure 7.24, we observe a few peaks for green dash
line around month 73. These peaks are caused by the updated mean and variance
of the excess return in 2006. As the mean of excess return increases by more than
twice, the pre-commitment investors immediately invest a huge amount of money
into the risky asset. As a result, we notice logarithm wealth (the green dash line
in Figure 7.23) jumps from 8 to 11. Compared with equilibrium strategies, the
pre-commitment strategies are more sensitive to the estimated parameters.
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Figure 7.23: The logarithm of wealth paths by pre-commitment equilibrium
strategies for 15 years investment period. The pre-commitment strategies have
been re-evaluated for every 1 year, 3 years and 5 years.
Figure 7.24: The pre-commitment strategies for 15 years investment period by
re-evaluating in every 1 year, 3 years and 5 years. The vertical dash lines indicate
the negative strategies (where logarithm is undefined).
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Figure 7.25: The truncated logarithm of pre-commitment strategies for 15 years
investment period by re-evaluating in every 1 year, 3 years and 5 years. The
vertical dash lines indicate the negative strategies. The strategies in the gap
between the blue lines are all negative.
7.3 Conclusion
This chapter uses numerical tools to assess the performance of three types of
strategies: pre-commitment, open-loop equilibrium and closed-loop equilibrium.
One of the main focuses of the research has been on the Sharpe ratio and prob-
ability density of the terminal wealth under different strategies. For the market
with independent and identical return, it has been shown that the equilibrium
strategies with constant risk aversion achieve better Sharpe ratio of terminal
wealth, whereas pre-commitment strategies are the profit-driven strategy which
yields better expected return with higher risk.
The second focus of the research is on a case study to compare the performance
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of different strategies. The case study has been classified into two situations: re-
evaluation prohibited and re-evaluation allowed. In the re-evaluation prohibited
case, the equilibrium strategies out-performs the pre-commitment strategies. For
pre-commitment strategies, once the target threshold is reached, the investors
will not take anymore risk. Our results indicate that the pre-commitment in-
vestors may undervalue the target investment threshold due to the length of in-
vestment period and initial wealth level. In contrast, there is no target threshold
for equilibrium investors. Comparing different equilibrium strategies, we find the
open-loop equilibrium strategies out-performs the closed-loop equilibrium strate-
gies as investment period increases, which is consistent with one observed in the
Monte Carlo simulation case.
When the re-evaluation is allowed, the terminal pay-off of pre-commitment strate-
gies increases along with the increase in the frequency of re-evaluation. The
updated asset parameters and wealth level for pre-commitment strategies lead
to a huge change in the trading volume. However, we show that there is no
guarantee on the terminal pay-off for equilibrium investors as the re-evaluation
frequency increases. This is because the updated asset parameters does not affect
the equilibrium strategies dramatically.
Finally, we evaluate performance of the investment by using the present-biased
risk-aversion coefficient. Similar to varying the risk attitude by wealth level,
the present-biased risk aversion allows the investors to adjust their risk attitude
based on the anticipated future investment environment. We show that the
improvement can be achieved in both booming market and recession market.
However, our results indicate that the investor’s biased level is able to cause a
more diverse wealth distribution.
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Chapter 8
Conclusion
8.1 Summary
This research studies the different types of equilibrium strategies for mean-
variance problem in discrete and continuous time. The focus is on analysing
the role of perturbation in different equilibrium methodologies in affecting the
dynamic of the wealth process. The goal is to explore the difference between open-
loop and closed-loop equilibrium strategies existing in the current literature and
identify the issues for implementing the equilibrium strategies in practice.
In Chapter 1, we describe the background and the motivation of the research.
Also, we propose a number of research questions and an overview of the thesis.
Chapter 2 presents a literature review on the main three strategies existing in
the literature namely: pre-commitment, open-loop equilibrium and closed-loop
equilibrium. The purpose is to identify the outcomes, issues and gaps in this
new implementation of equilibrium methodology for mean-variance problem. By
reviewing the equilibrium strategies for mean-variance problem, we notice the
different results for equilibrium strategies which may impact investors’ financial
decisions. Understanding the different rationale behind the equilibrium strate-
gies helps the investors to choose the best strategy corresponding to their own
preference.
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Chapter 3 initiates the main research by studying the equilibrium strategies in
discrete time. Although the continuous framework already provides an explicit
solution for equilibrium strategy, there is still a gap between understanding the
behaviour of equilibrium strategy and implementing the solution of the problem.
In a discrete time setting, the behaviour of the strategy and the dynamic of
the wealth are trackable by constructing the equilibrium strategy recursively.
By incorporating concepts from open-loop controls in engineering, we take the
perturbation affecting the wealth dynamic in a specific way and derive a necessary
and sufficient condition for open-loop equilibrium strategy. A analytic study of
existence and uniqueness of the open-loop equilibrium strategy has been carried
out.
Chapter 4 shows a perturbation acts on the wealth in a different way in order to
obtain the closed-loop equilibrium strategies. Together with results from Chap-
ter 3, a key behavioural feature of equilibrium investors is that the investors divide
their investment plan into two parts: short-term and long-term plans. Once the
short-term plan is chosen, the investors combine the short-term plan with any
long-term investment plan and test different amount of investment in short-term
investment plan. Therefore, the equilibrium strategy is the strategy that yields
the best outcome of the objective function among these combinations. This in-
terpretation allows us to draw out the key different behaviour between open-loop
and closed-loop investors. The open-loop short-term strategy (perturbation) only
invests in the stock market for a single-period and deposits the investment into
bank account until the maturity, whereas the closed-loop short-term strategy
invests in the stock market and leaves the investment until the maturity.
Chapter 5 develops open-loop equilibrium strategies in continuous time by using
a different type of perturbation. Compared with the random variable of pertur-
bation used in Hu et al. (2012), we relax the perturbation as a random process.
We have shown that the random process perturbation yields the same condi-
tion as the random variable perturbation. Therefore, the type of equilibrium
strategies depends on the way that the perturbation affects the wealth dynam-
ics. Compared with the continuous time framework, the discrete time framework
provides more flexibility for the equilibrium investor in choosing the short-term
investment plan (perturbation).
Chapter 6.2 addresses issues for equilibrium strategies for practical implemen-
tation. As time moves away from maturity, the investment amount for both
closed-loop and open-loop strategies decays. The open-loop equilibrium decays
to zero, whereas the closed-loop equilibrium decays to a negative limit. A proper
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relation between the value of the limit and the model parameters has been identi-
fied by the Sharpe ratio of the risky asset in Chapter 4. By incorporating concepts
from behavioural economics, we focus on modifying the risk aversion parameter
which represents the preference of the incarnations of investor at different time
point.
Chapter 7 uses numerical tools to assess the performance of pre-commitment,
open-loop and closed-loop equilibrium strategies in various situations. Our anal-
ysis shows that, the equilibrium strategies are preferable to pre-commitment
strategies when the re-evaluation is prohibited. Comparing between the closed-
loop and open-loop equilibrium strategies, we find that the performance of the
closed-loop equilibrium deteriorates as the investment period increases. When
the re-evaluation is allowed, the equilibrium strategies are not as sensitive as
the pre-commitment strategies to the updated parameters of the assets. As a
result, the pre-commitment strategies out-performs the equilibrium strategies as
the re-evaluation frequency increases. Finally, we show that the improvement of
the investment can be achieved by implementing the present-biased risk-aversion
coefficient.
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